Securing Venues of Education and Leisure

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About This Issue

This second issue of the electronic journal, The Journal of the Global Homeland Security Education Network (JGHSN), seeks to explore some of the implications of recent events upon security discourses. The Boston Marathon bombing and the tragic elementary school shooting in Newtown, Connecticut, have highlighted once again the apparent dichotomy between discourses on security and freedom. Such discourses have some similarities to those witnessed after the cinema massacre in Aurora, Colorado. In a nation where the amount of firearms in private circulation is alleged to be equal to the actual population of the US, there appears little common ground between those who advocate the right to bear arms on the one hand, and those who argue in favour of tighter regulation on the other.

Similar discourses can be observed internationally, with the London Olympics being a good recent example. Spectators at several events had to endure the type of security checks that are most often found at airports, and which are being suggested as possible means of preventing further mass shootings in the United States. In itself, this creates puzzles and paradoxes. For example, will it be necessary to install airport security measures in venues such as movie theatres? How does the public/private dichotomy play out when it comes to the security of what might be described as “ordinary life”? Where does democratic accountability lie when it comes to overseeing the conduct of security firms? To what extent will the calls for increased means of self-protection become a policy of choice? Further factors to consider might include whether the alleged security threat to “ordinary life” has perhaps been over-exaggerated in a discourse that has been molded by the security industry. Furthermore, what sorts of implications might this new security paradigm have for the relationship between the individual citizen on the one hand, and the public/private sectors on the other? In other words, how might this new security paradigm impact upon civil liberties? And what issues arise from having the armed forces on standby for events such as the Olympic Games, or police officers on duty in movie theatres or schools?

The articles and reports in this issue of JGHSN focus on some of the aspects of these questions. The content comes from an array of subject areas that can be included in the broad range of homeland security concerns. This issue in its way represents innovative multi- and inter-disciplinary scholarship that engages with key issues in homeland security education issues.

The goal of the Journal of the Global Homeland Security Education Network is to allow for the publication of innovative contributions in the examination of transnational, comparative, and cooperative international efforts to ensure and advance homeland security. The JGHSN will serve as a venue to allow for academics, researchers, and practitioners to publish through this electronic journal articles describing relevant research or practice.

The Global Homeland Security Education Network (GHSEN) seeks to provide an internet-based venue to bring together individuals and institutions from across the globe dedicated to advancing homeland security education as evidenced in many disciplines and areas. The GHSEN is a product of the work of a consortium of universities under a EU-U.S. Atlantis grant (P116J090056) from the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education, (FIPSE), U.S. Department of Education and the European Union’s Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (156478-UK-2009-USA0M).

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Robert Homant received his Ph.D. in clinical and social psychology from Michigan State in 1972. He has been a professor of criminal justice at the University of Detroit Mercy since 1978, where he is currently department chair. His research interests have focused on the application of psychological theories and concepts to law enforcement and corrections issues, including police pursuit, suicide by cop, crime scene profiling, and risky altruism as a cause of victimization.

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Certainty through Flexibility: Intelligence and Paramilitarization in Canadian Public Order Policing\footnote{The bulk of this paper was drawn from the author’s M.A. thesis in Criminology submitted to Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies at the University of Ottawa in March 2012. See https://ruor.uottawa.ca/en/handle/10393/2267}

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Abstract  
This article explores public order policing literature from a Canadian perspective, and then discusses this in relation to two Canadian-specific public order events: the Vancouver Olympics and G20 Summit in Toronto. The source material is drawn from media coverage of these events. These cases are analyzed using prior theoretical works in order to achieve two research goals: to discover which theory best explains police actions and the extent of and reasons for the involvement of other government agencies in securing protest events in Canada. Using pattern matching methodology, it is argued that the ‘intelligent control’ theory of public order policing was most applicable to the two cases due to its emphasis on police use of intelligence. Finally, it was found that there was a noticeable presence and integration of other government agencies involved in securing both events.

Introduction: TIME Magazine’s ‘Year of the Protestor’  
Over the last century, Canada has witnessed an array of public disorder events, from the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 to the confrontational Aboriginal protests of the early 1990s catalyzed by the Oka conflict and Ipperwash Crisis. It would be naive to suggest that this social phenomenon will subside or become insignificant in the coming years. For 2011, this was highlighted by the many ‘Occupy’ movements. From a Canadian perspective, 2010 was a notable year for social protest including the Vancouver Olympics and the G20 Summit in Toronto. These events presented criminologists with an important opportunity to better illuminate the limitations and debates in current public order policing literature.

The Vancouver Olympics involved the presence of over 6,000 police officers, not including thousands of military personnel, as well as 4,800 private security workers (McLean, June 7, 2010). Moreover, the Olympics saw the installation of over 900 closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras (ibid). Comparatively, the G20 Summits drew approximately 15,000 public police and private security officers, as well as 5,000 military personnel (Freeze, April 7, 2010). The cost for security at the Olympics totalled approximately $833 million (McLean, June 7, 2010). It has recently been reported by the federal government that security at the G20 Summit surpassed that of the Olympics, and was the largest and most expensive security event in Canadian history (Alcoba, February 23, 2010). In their G20 After Action Review (June 2011), the Toronto Police Service (TOPS) state that during the G20, “the TPS and its partner agencies were faced with sustained, serious, and widespread criminality and public disorder ... The scope and intensity of the disorder are without precedent in the history of the TPS” (p. 58). These events exceed all previous security undertakings in Canada, and are important case studies of public order policing.

This paper examines public disorder events and policing at the Vancouver Olympics and the G20 Summit as depicted in the media. We do not seek to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between how particular events or situations shape others (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006, p.33). Rather, we attempt only to assess the extent to which various explanatory models fit the circumstances of each case, as depicted through media sources. This methodology has many limitations, which will be elaborated on below.

More specifically, six different theories of public order policing were explicated through an extensive literature review, with the two Canadian case studies used as further clarification. We also examine the extent to which security functions were shared with other organizations during the Olympics and G20. In the end, Hall and de Lint’s work on ‘intelligent control’ was found to be most applicable, albeit with some adjustments required. For this reason, and due to the need for brevity, only Hall and de Lint’s theory will be discussed in this paper (see footnote 1 for more information).

The Literature: Building the intellectual scaffolding  
Academic polarization on the topic of policing is not novel; where many academics can easily be placed into the anti-police or pro-police categories (for historical perspective on this debate see Grant, 1975). As we will see below, the debate has moved beyond the ‘conflict’ and ‘consensus’ literature, to a more
A nuanced discussion of use of force, information gathering, liaison and paramilitary tactics. Below is a brief illustration of the debates and limitations of relevant public order policing theories.

The consensus/conflict dichotomy has roots in the push between two early public order policing theories: escalated force and negotiated management. The former theory begins with the assumption that police view crowds as irrational and in need of being coercively controlled (Della Porta & Reiter, 2006, p. 176). The escalated force model also includes a low tolerance of disruption, minimal use of communication, frequent arrests, and a high use of force (p. 101). As the civil rights movement progressed and the labour movement became more powerful, there was a move away from escalated force to a more measured form of liaison and negotiation, known as negotiated management. Following these shifts, the theoretical waters become murky, with many academics arguing that we are witnessing a move back toward coercion, and others countering that we are seeing more negotiation and liaison. Other scholars, such as Della Porta and Reiter (1998, 2006) and Hall and de Lint (2005), argue that a blending has occurred between these two models.

Della Porta and Reiter (1998) saw three corresponding issues in public order policing beginning in the 1990s: an attempt to negotiate outcomes; the under-enforcement of the law; and the extensive collection of information (p. 8). Some refer to the latter as intelligence gathering and according to the authors can be traced back to the 1930s, where surveillance and information gathering was an essential tactic to tackle subversion and dissent, particularly in the U.S. (p. 7). In fact, this phenomenon goes back to the late 19th century, when the Pinkerton Agency engaged in the infiltration and intimidation of unions, and general strikebreaking. Moreover, neither of the other two developments (negotiation and under enforcement of the law) are novel, taking shape in policing tactics in the 1960s and 1970s (see D. Waddington, 2007). What is original is their conceptual convergence in a model of public order policing. From a Canadian perspective, the work of Hall and de Lint (2005) is the most relevant (discussed below).

Della Porta and Reiter (2006) later elaborated on their theory while researching the protests at the 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. Here, the authors found evidence to suggest that the contention that public order policing strategies are moving towards de-escalation (negotiated management) in western societies is faulty (p. 40). In fact, the authors found that the use of escalated force and coercive strategies were predominant during the Genoa protests (p. 22). The authors conclude that the policing of the G8 in Genoa was characterized primarily by coercive strategies; e.g. the mass use of riot weaponry (tear gas, live ammunition, armoured vehicles, and mass arrests) (pp. 19, 21). With regard to public order policing generally, the authors believe this event could suggest a reversal of previous moves away from escalated force.

On the other side of the debate, there are academics such as Fernandez (2008) who clearly situates himself in the school of thought that argues that police, and ultimately the state, seek to control and coerce dissent through violence and repression (see Donner, 1992; and Earl and Soule, 2010). More specifically, Fernandez argues in Policing Dissent, that police seek to regulate and pacify free speech and radical thought, not only on the streets, but in the legal, physical, and psychological fields that surround protests (pp. 5-6). Focusing on the anti-globalization movement, Fernandez argues that this type of dissent is composed of interconnected network structures, which police agencies seek to “blunt and possibly destroy” (ibid). Simply put, Fernandez compares social control techniques to that of disease control (p. 130).

Drawing on much of the work completed by Della Porta and Reiter (2006), Hall and de Lint (2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; and 2009) tackle the comprehensive development of a theoretical framework for categorizing public order policing from a Canadian perspective. Unlike Della Porta and Reiter, who generally argue that there has been a broad shift from coercive to conciliatory tactics (Della Porta and Reiter, 1998), and now a shift back towards coercion (Della Porta, Peterson, and Reiter, 2006), de Lint and Hall (2009) argue that the police operate autonomously of overarching political and economic structures and may neutralize public disorder through excessive force as well as conciliatory measures (p. 5). In this sense, the authors view contemporary strategies as a synthesis of negotiation and coercive models of policing. Their 2009 monograph, titled Intelligent Control: Developments in Public Order Policing in Canada, fully develops this theory of public order policing, which they term ‘intelligent control’.

Hall and de Lint (2009) agree with Della Porta and Reiter that U.S. and European research has indicated a shift towards minimizing the use of force, and an emphasis placed on communications, flexibility, and negotiation (p. 11). Similarly, ‘intelligent control’ argues that there has been a shift in Canadian public order policing tactics, from ad hoc reactionary forms of coercion and accommodation, to what the authors call “a strategic integrated approach” (p. 5). This integration is composed of several key variables discussed in great detail by these authors; liaison strategies to pre-empt and minimize the need to
employ force in protest situations, as well as enhanced technical and paramilitary abilities supported by intelligence gathering (p. 6).

The interconnectedness of policing and intelligence capabilities has gained much traction in the post-9/11 environment, where risk and threat assessments have become normative tools in policing toolboxes. The intelligence component of policing represents a type of ‘boundlessness’; whereby intelligence gatherers can operate freely in different social and technological environments (Hall & de Lint, 2009, p. 270). This component also includes the increased use of surveillance, both human and technological, which generates actionable intelligence and gives police the ability to pre-empt perceived threats (p. 266).

Intelligence can be generally defined as the combination of information-gathering with the value-added of analysis (George and Bruce, 2008). In 1984, the function of national security intelligence was severed from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) mandate due to several high-profile controversies, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) was created as a separate government agency. This was due to the perceived incompatibility of the policing and intelligence professions. That is, the primary customer of intelligence traditionally has been the government, who assigns intelligence-gatherers their priorities. Whereas, a principal of policing is that it is arm’s-length of government direction and enforces the law impartially. This is disputed however, by authors such as Roach (2007) and Beare (2007) who argue that there is no consensus regarding police independence of government, and claim that this is a contemporary argument that is overstated in the literature. Despite this, intelligence agencies by definition are subject to strong government direction; whereas it is at the very least debatable the extent to which police agencies are subject to similar direction.

An important criticism of Hall and de Lint’s recent work on ‘intelligent control’ has been levelled by Walby and Hurl (2010). The reviewers argue that although Hall and de Lint place an important emphasis on the intelligence capabilities of police forces, they provide few empirical illustrations of this phenomenon. Consider the following:

De Lint and Hall do not provide many empirical examples of how organizations like CSIS become involved in demobilizing local struggles. They mention the work of Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams and Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in facilitating surveillance cum social movement suppression, but do not provide many empirical examples to support this claim...These important points deserve to be substantiated (p. 216).

A further argument that is made by Walby and Hurl is related to how Hall and de Lint focus too heavily on the labour movement in their analysis, neglecting the importance of other social movements and civil disobedience (p. 217). This does not preclude the full application of ‘intelligent control’ to other social movements however, and seems to beg for a less hasty analysis.

It is worth noting that the literature reviewed for this study is not specific to Canada. Although it applies to the Canadian experience due to our shared experiences and history with other developed countries, compared to Europe and the US there are fewer examples of Canada-specific literature such as Hall and de Lint’s work.

What emerges out of the current discussion of public order policing literature is that there are important divergences worth exploring. Authors such as Della Porta, Reiter, as well as Hall and de Lint see a fusion of the negotiated management and escalated force theories. Authors such as Fernandez clearly argue that what we are currently witnessing in the public order policing realm are coercive strategies aimed at delegitimizing, neutralizing, and excluding social movements all together. In the analysis that follows, we will try to clarify and focus this debate from a Canadian perspective based on two public order events.

**Methodology**

Pattern matching methodology was used to interpret media reported data for this deductive qualitative study, because it moves from the general to specific, beginning with theoretical models and then moving to gather data and develop analysis which can act as a test of those particular theoretical propositions. The data gathered are from Canadian news organizations (n=529) (e.g. Vancouver Sun, Toronto Star, Ottawa Citizen, CBC, etc.).

A non-equivalent dependent variable design was employed for the pattern matching process. Each theory represents a predicted pattern, each having multiple dependent variables. A table was developed for each theory, which is composed of the elements that comprised the particular theory. Therefore, each news article was analyzed and coded based on the variables articulated by each theory. For instance, if an article described police meeting with protesters, this was coded as 1 instance for the variable “meeting with protesters”. The following is the ‘intelligent control’ data table:
Intelligent Control Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour Olympics</th>
<th>Vancouver Olympics</th>
<th>Toronto G20</th>
<th>Liaison Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td>Yes (n=6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Relations</td>
<td>Yes (n=1)</td>
<td>Yes (n=1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention</td>
<td>Yes (n=2)</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under enforcement of Law/Restrain</td>
<td>Yes (n=2)</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/Pamphlets</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td>Yes (n=6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Yes (n=3)</td>
<td>Yes (n=1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with Protestors</td>
<td>Yes (n=4)</td>
<td>Yes (n=9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort Services</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartiality</td>
<td>Yes (n=1)</td>
<td>Yes (n=1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Emphasis on Self-Policing</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td>Yes (n=1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Brokering</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td>Yes (n=1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferral to Courts</td>
<td>Yes (n=1)</td>
<td>Yes (n=1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employing Officers as Liaisons</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intelligence Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour Olympics</th>
<th>Vancouver Olympics</th>
<th>Toronto G20</th>
<th>Liaison Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Surveillance</td>
<td>Yes (n=7)</td>
<td>Yes (n=18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological Surveillance</td>
<td>Yes (n=1)</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preemptive Detention</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td>Yes (n=3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blurring - Policing and National Security</td>
<td>Yes (n=15)</td>
<td>Yes (n=18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflexive Dramatization (PR)</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Information (Asymmetric)</td>
<td>Yes (n=2)</td>
<td>Yes (n=2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overt Displays of Authority</td>
<td>No (n=0)</td>
<td>Yes (n=3)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Paramilitarization</td>
<td>Yes (n=8)</td>
<td>Yes (n=280)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy of Force</td>
<td>Yes (n=2)</td>
<td>Yes (n=3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Civilian Intelligence Agencies</td>
<td>Yes (n=12)</td>
<td>Yes (n=16)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Covert Intelligence Gathering</td>
<td>Yes (n=5)</td>
<td>Yes (n=16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective and Strategic Use of Force</td>
<td>Yes (n=6)</td>
<td>Yes (n=2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Controls</td>
<td>Yes (n=3)</td>
<td>Yes (n=2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plainclothes Police</td>
<td>Yes (n=6)</td>
<td>Yes (n=7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Hall and de Lint (2009)

If, for a predicted result, the variables have been found and substitute patterns have not, then causal inferences can be made (Yin, 2009, p. 137). The process of seeing whether these patterns are evident will determine which of the theories have the most substantial overlap with the observed patterns in both cases under study. This did not allow us to make broad conclusions concerning public order policing in Canada, however served to further clarify the literature on the topic from a Canadian perspective. In the end, Hall and de Lint’s (2009) work on ‘intelligent control’ was found to be the most appropriate, and will be the only theory discussed in this paper.

There are many limits to relying on the mainstream media for objective facts and accounts of protest events. First, there is a bias among mainstream media that have a tendency to report what other media outlets are reporting, thus neglecting potentially informative events that would benefit data analysis. Second, the media focus on exceptional stories over ordinary or common events can skew data results, which could simply be an accumulation of sensational reporting. This can give the perception that atypical social phenomenon are in fact more frequent than is the case. There is also the potential for political bias to influence media reports of events, which can affect the tone and conclusions of studies (see Kuypers, 2002). Finally, media reports can lack essential information and any in-depth analysis of events.

External validity is a concern, as it relates to the ability of a study to generalize. That said, the goal of the current work is not to generalize to social phenomena, but rather to generalize to theoretical propositions in the field of public order policing. This is what is referred to as analytical generalization, rather than statistical generalization, which is common in probability sample survey research (Yin, 2009, p. 43). Because this study is based on media reporting, the ability to generalize is decidedly limited.

An internal validity concern is ensuring the accurate measurement of what the stated concepts are (referred to as face validity). The methodology used in the original study is pattern matching, which can be an effective tool to increasing a study’s internal validity (Yin, 2009, p. 43), as it acts as a determinant to which of the literature most accurately characterizes and explains Canadian events.

The primary mechanism for ensuring accuracy amongst the print news media items collected is the use of provincial press councils. The triangulation of sources was also used to alleviate some selection bias by accounting for a larger pool of event coverage. Triangulation also helps account for description bias by providing the researcher with numerous accounts of a particular event.
Editorial or other rhetorical discourse was excluded from data analysis so as to avoid bias in the representation and description of events.

Finally, an important point that must be made clear is that the conclusions and discussion being drawn from the results is limited only to media representations of social phenomenon rather than social facts themselves.

Narrative: Olympics

The 21st Winter Olympics Games were held in Vancouver from February 12 – 28, 2010. Approximately 2,600 athletes from 82 countries congregated to participate in the event, which drew large crowds from all over the world, including protesters. Prior to the Olympics, a RCMP-led Integrated Security Unit (ISU) was formed with representation from municipal, provincial, and federal police and other government security agencies. There were approximately 7,000 public police and 4,500 military personnel present during the Olympics. The protest groups that were reported through the media as being present at the Olympics included anti-poverty, anti-war, Aboriginal, and anti-globalization groups.

In the end, the games saw some protest events, although most were peaceful, and the British Columbia (BC) Solicitor General praised the police and security personnel for their efforts in what was reported as a peaceful and secure Olympic Games. The media reported there being 36 separate protests during the Olympics, all of which were peaceful, excluding the vandalism that occurred in the downtown area by the 200 masked protesters on Saturday February 13, 2010. There were no formal police mentions of arrests made during the Olympics; however it was noted in the media that 93 individuals were arrested for ‘breach of the peace’. For a discussion on security and the 2012 London Summer Olympics, please see X’s contribution to the current volume.

Narrative: G20 Summit

The Toronto G20 Summit was a gathering that took place in Toronto, Ontario, during the weekend of June 26 – 27, 2010. This was the fourth meeting of G20 heads of state who gather to discuss the global economy and financial system. Prior to the G20 weekend, an ISU was formed and consisted of personnel from various regional, provincial, and federal policing and security-related agencies. The G20 required approximately 15,000 public police and private security officers, a personnel total that surpasses that of the Olympics, which pegs the G20 as the largest security event in Canadian history, costing taxpayers approximately $1 billion Canadian dollars.

Prior to the G20, the Ontario provincial government (OG) approved a temporary regulation based on the Public Works Protection Act (PWPA). The OG designated the security zone at the G20 as a ‘public work’ as defined under the PWPA. This legislation allowed police to question, search and deny entry to suspicious individuals who come within five meters of the G20 security fence. In the end, both the OG and TPS acknowledged that the law was misinterpreted by the police during the G20, and that the law did not give police the right to demand identification from people passing by the security fence.

Actions against the G20 began well before the event itself, starting with the firebombing of an Royal Bank of Canada branch in Ottawa which prompted an increase of security by the ISU. Prior to the G20 there was also a large detention centre opened in anticipation of large-scale arrests. Major protest actions began on the Friday of the G20 weekend, where several main streets were shut down. Following mass protest events on Saturday, media reports from Sunday show an increase in confrontation and violence. Police and protesters engaged in often violent confrontations in various parts of the downtown area. In the end, over 900 people were arrested during the G20 in what is reported to be the largest what in Canadian history.

Arrests at High-Profile Canadian Events
Results

The data results for the theory of ‘intelligent control’ were separated into two categories; liaison and intelligence strategies. In media reports, liaison strategies were not as prominent as the intelligence ones. The following is a selection of noteworthy observations as reported through the media:

- At both the G20 and Olympics, there were dedicated police officers designated as public relations or communications officers;
- At the Olympics, the media observed that police engaged in non-intervention activities;
- During both events, the media reported that police were engaged in meeting with various protest groups;
- The use of human and covert intelligence gathering at both events was reported in the media;
- Prior to both events, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as well as various police forces met ‘in confidence’ with protestors, their neighbours and friends;
- Police developed strategies during the events to provide real-time intelligence;
- The police and CSIS were engaging in similar activities; and,
- Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) were present at both events, which shares intelligence between law enforcement and government agencies.

The Intelligence Mélange: The fusing of policing and intelligence work

We began by illustrating that there are important discrepancies in the public order policing literature, and outlining that academics are calling for further research. Della Porta, Reiter, Hall, and de Lint witnessed a fusion of the negotiated management and escalated force theories; whereas authors such as Fernandez saw the continued use of coercive strategies aimed at delegitimizing, neutralizing, and excluding protestors. In the end, the current study found that Hall and de Lint’s work was the most applicable, and will be discussed below.

Liaison Strategies

At the Olympics, media reporting showed that there was evidence of non-intervention, public relations, under-enforcement of the law, negotiation, meeting with protestors, impartiality, and deferring to the courts. Police also met and negotiated with protestors. For instance, the ISU had a Community Relations Group (CRG) that met regularly with local activist organizations in order to discuss protesting zones.

At the G20, there were some instances of liaison strategies being used by police, as reported through the media, and others that were completely absent. For instance, there was no reporting of police non-intervention or the under-enforcement of the law. That said there was evidence of police public relations, pamphlet distribution, negotiating and meeting with protestors and information brokering. For example, police prior to the G20 distributed approximately a million flyers to Toronto households outlining police authorities and what the security zones meant for local residents. There was also a CRG, which was dedicated to activist and protestor outreach (Toronto Police Service, 2009, 55).

The fact that liaison strategies were evident at both cases is an interesting point. Despite the fact that the G20 was clearly more confrontational than the Olympics, police deployed early liaison strategies possibly as an attempt to avoid or minimize the potential for conflict. Similarly, we saw in the literature review that some authors (see Fernandez, 2008) believe that liaison is a tactic of the past, having been overtaken by more coercive methods of quelling protest. Based on media reported data from these two cases, the current study suggests that liaison approaches to public order policing in Canada may still be employed. Based on the literature and the case studies, we argue that rather than becoming more repressive, police in Canada seem to continue to employ liaison as a tactic.

Intelligence Strategies

The intelligence strategies that were evident during the Olympics and G20 are the most informative aspect of the current paper. The media-reported evidence outlined below suggests possibly that Canada is seeing an increase in police reliance on strategies not traditionally viewed as a policing function.

The issue of police and government security agencies engaging in similar practices highlights what Hall and de Lint (2009) refer to as the increasing blurring of policing and national security. At the Olympics, this was evident through the RCMP’s Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) which was composed of

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1 For pattern matching tables of all theories of public order policing applied to the current cases, see full thesis at https://ruor.uottawa.ca/ruor/13753/22677
government agencies responsible for security and intelligence (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009, 21). Further, prior to the Olympics a threat assessment was obtained by the media which shows that police identified Canada as a priority target for such groups as Al Qaeda due to our relationship with the US and military role in Afghanistan. That said, as time passed, the ISU released statements indicating that the threat from terrorism to the Olympics was low.

Based on media reports used in this study, the G20 saw substantially more instances of intelligence strategies than did the Olympics. There was media evidence found of surveillance, such as each front-line police officer being equipped with microphones that record and wirelessly transmit interactions with protestors. Highlighting the use of intelligence agencies was one incident where video footage was taken of an alleged CSIS employee talking to Aboriginal protestors ahead of the G20. In the weeks prior to the summit, the media reported that there were 28 incidents of activists being approached concerning their protest plans, eight of which were approached by CSIS and the remainder by TPS. Further, a CSIS spokesperson acknowledged that the agency had conducted private interviews relating to certain G20 activists. That said, this study is not suggesting these activities are sinister or nefarious; with proper accountability and oversight these activities are essential to safeguarding public safety.

Media reporting showed the use of pre-emptive arrest as a police tactic, where undercover work led to some 50 pre-emptive arrests ahead of the G20. Also, prior to the G20, the head of CSIS stated to the media the following: “while the RCMP is the lead agency in securing the summits, CSIS has spent the past 12 to 18 months gathering intelligence it hopes could help the RCMP with...breaches of the law that might occur”. This highlights the potential interconnectedness and cooperation between various organizations ahead of large events such as the G20.

The function of intelligence being used as a policing tool is an important consideration that must be further elaborated in the criminological literature. For example, questions have been raised such as, to what extent are traditional intelligence functions being used, adjusted, or discarded by law enforcement agencies in Canada? Also, to what extent does government play a role in tasking policing agencies with intelligence work, what repercussions will this have on the separation of government and law enforcement? And most importantly, should there be such a separation in times of crisis and public disorder?

The above serves to illustrate the potential importance of intelligence strategies. The implications of this conclusion are numerous. Hall and de Lint (2009) argue that there is an increasing fusion of law enforcement and national security in Canada. This study serves to corroborate the increasingly evident observation that police and national security personnel are playing a dual and often integrated role prior to and during high-profile events in Canada.

Other Government Agencies Involved in Security

The evidence gathered for this paper suggests that from a Canadian perspective, other government agencies are likely being involved in security and policing at major events. For instance, at the G20 the RCMP coordinated overall security; however other departments involved included National Defence and Canadian Forces and CSIS. INSETs were also deployed to help with security investigations at both events. INSET teams are comprised of personnel from the Canada Border Service Agency, CSIS, RCMP, and municipal and provincial police forces and have a specialized role to assist in the investigation of terrorism. This conclusion was identical for the Olympics.

These reports along with a review of the literature, particularly Hall and de Lint (2009), suggest a robust and often integrated approach to security during major events in Canada. The presence of many government agencies, not just police, suggests that the security associated with large events in Canada is conducted by an array of government departments with different mandates. We need to consider how we can account for this in the literature and, just as importantly, can this have theoretical or policy implications?

Hall and de Lint (2009) explicitly state in their work that more and more demonstrations are being “countered or managed by joint task forces or operations consisting of sometimes a dozen or more different public agencies” (5). This reality is the result of police agencies, which are typically the lead on major events, attempting to exercise greater control over public order events by maximizing flexibility and reducing the need for direct intervention. This result is achieved by employing front-end strategies such as large scale planning and intelligence gathering. We argue that this reliance on other government departments is not only evidence of integration, but also a method of promoting flexibility by adding the mandates of other agencies to policing toolboxes, in the end creating more control over dynamic situations.

Other Considerations

Policy implications of this study include, but are not limited to: the repercussions on access to information and information secrecy, the need to monitor social media in our digital age, the separation of terrorism, risk and conventional crimes, and the increasing of information flow and data
management for law enforcement agencies. With regards to social media, more work is needed to examine the current revolution occurring in the use of social media and its implications for both police and protesters. For future research, scholars must consider not only how social media facilitates peaceful protests and violent spontaneous riots, but how it can act as an informal accountability mechanism against police brutality.

In the end, media reports have given us an imperfect lens with which we can look at public order policing at the G20 Summit and Olympics. Indeed, media reports are a selective and often biased source of information. Based on the nature of intelligence work, researchers will find it difficult to access information needed to draw theoretical distinctions and conclusions. There is an undeniable methodological tension in studying intelligence work using only open sources. We used media reports due to this access limitation, rendering the results limited. For future research it will be invaluable to consider other sources of data to see whether different conclusions can be drawn. For instance, data can and should be collected from direct field observations, press releases, alternative media, social media, as well as police, business owners, and decision-makers themselves.

Conclusion

There has been a noticeable shift in public order policing literature, moving from authoritative practices in the 1960s to more consensual tactics throughout the 1970s and 80s (Della Porta and Reiter, 2006, 101), primarily as a response to labour strikes (Hall and de Lint, 2009). Moving on from the 1980s there is an evident disjuncture in what the relevant academics view as the trajectory of public order policing. Authors such as Fernandez (2008) view police as an extension of the interests of a powerful elite, the former exerting control over citizens in order to coercively quell peaceful dissent. Fernandez referred to these practices as ‘textures of control’. Della Porta and Reiter (2006) agree with Fernandez (2009) that there are coercive methods employed by police against protestors in western democracies (Della Porta and Reiter, 2006, 22). However, in their research of the G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy, Della Porta and Reiter found two other strategies, persuasive and information strategies, to be prominent (13), although not as dominant as coercive strategies (19; 21).

In analyzing this literature and the two cases, we argue that the ‘intelligent control’ model of public order policing was the most appropriate theory applicable to reports of these events. Although, through analytic
References


The Effect of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Participation in Leisure Time Events

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Abstract
Four versions of a questionnaire, describing differing levels of terrorist threat and security at a hypothetical concert, were randomly distributed to 287 subjects in four samples in Detroit and New York. Scenarios indicating a vague threat from “al Qaeda in the Americas” resulted in significantly less willingness to attend the concert. Increased levels of security did not have a significant effect on the decision to attend; if anything, there was a slight trend for increased security to lower attendance when combined with the threat, possibly because subjects took the threat more seriously. Subjects who had previously avoided an event because of concerns about terrorism were more likely to be affected by the threat in the scenarios. Avoidance of previous events was related to having been more strongly affected by the events of 9/11 and to having a greater belief in the likelihood of future terrorism. Avoidance of past events was not related to support for the Patriot Act, which was a fairly direct function of political conservativism, as measured by the criminal responsibility scale. Belief in the probability of a future terrorist event, i.e., being low on optimism bias, was related to both avoidance of events and support for the Patriot Act.

The events of 9/11/2001 ushered in a number of changes in law enforcement. These include legal measures such as the Patriot Act (officially: USA PATRIOT Act), the establishment of “fusion centers” to coordinate the sharing of information by federal, state, and local police agencies under the aegis of a newly created Department of Homeland Security, and a shift in policing priorities toward preparedness regarding possible terrorist threats. Over ten years have passed since these changes were first initiated, and this time lapse has provided the opportunity for evaluation and criticism. One of the strongest negative criticisms of post 9/11 counter-terrorism efforts has come from Molotch (2012), who argued that as a society we have given up too much of our personal comfort and convenience in return for very questionable gains in security from “ambiguous danger”. Chappell and Gibson (2009), on the other hand, find “homeland security policing” to be reasonably compatible with community policing and take a generally optimistic view. The primary purpose of the present research is to examine the extent to which people’s decisions to participate in cultural events, such as attending a concert, are affected by various threats and official counter-measures.

Counter-Terrorism Measures

Several counter-terrorism measures have received attention in the academic and popular literature. The most controversial measures involve limitations on civil liberties and other legal rights. One such measure is the Patriot Act, which many have criticized (especially on the left) as government overreach (cf. Smith & Hung, 2010). Nevertheless, the Act was renewed under the Obama administration in 2011 with relatively few amendments and with solid bipartisan support. The Patriot Act also continues to have public support, though with significant opposition (Pew Research Center, 2011). Measures of public opinion, however, may not mean much because of the act’s length and complexity (Best & McDermott, 2007).

Coercive or “enhanced” interrogation has also been a matter of some controversy (Homant & Witkowski, 2011) and the recent release of the major motion picture Zero Dark Thirty, which dramatically portrays the use of waterboarding in the search for Osama bin Laden, is likely to increase the spotlight on this issue in the popular press if not in academic research.

Fusion centers have not been controversial in the sense that the Patriot Act and “enhanced interrogation” have been, and academic research has focused on how effectively various urban agencies have cooperated in carrying out the directions of the Department of Homeland Security. Fusion centers are part of a nationally coordinated effort to enable various law enforcement agencies to share information and resources across jurisdictional boundaries. Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) found that “governance maturity,” or the degree

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of cooperation within an agency, was more important than financial resources in producing good communication.

Finally, the concern has been raised that a focus on counter-terrorism may be detrimental to the emphasis on community or problem solving policing that had begun to predominate as a law enforcement philosophy at the turn of the new millennium (Roberts, Roberts, & Liedka, 2012). Chappell and Gibson (2009) found that most major police departments have not had a problem in merging the goals of counter-terrorism with those of community policing. There is some concern, however, that federal financial support has been diverted from community policing to counter-terrorism policing (Oliver, 2006).

Also, Newman and Brown (2009) found that the perceived need to profile potential terrorists was likely to detract from a community policing approach, especially if the community in question contained a substantial number of Middle Eastern males (who would be placed under heightened scrutiny).

Besides looking at preparedness from an agency or institutional perspective, researchers have also examined the public’s degree of concern. Caponecchia (2012) surveyed residents of Sydney Australia to determine whether "optimism bias" affected preparedness for a possible terrorist event. Optimism bias was defined as the belief that a negative event is less likely to happen to oneself than to the average person. Caponecchia found a tendency for individuals to show an optimism bias with respect to terrorism affecting themselves personally, though this trend was statistically significant only for "witnessing a suspicious event that might be terrorism" (p. 1528). That is, subjects believed that this was more likely to happen to other people than to themselves. On the other hand, subjects did not show optimism bias with respect to their own city (Sydney), which they felt was more likely than other (Australian) cities to experience a terrorist event. They had a low level of awareness that Sydney had a warning system in place along with various "safe sites," and on a personal level "over 75% of participants [rated] their home as 'not at all' prepared for terrorism" (p. 1529).

In an American study, Gross, Brewer, and Aday (2009) found that positive feelings (pride and hope) toward the country were highly correlated with confidence in government institutions in the fight against terrorism. However, whether or not such confidence would increase or decrease willingness to rely on officials to provide appropriate security at public events was not clear.

We should not end this brief review without referencing the recent spate of mass shootings in the U. S. The Sandy Hook (Newtown CT) elementary school (12/14/12), the Clackamas OR Town Center Mall shooting (12/11/12), the Minneapolis MN sign manufacturing workplace (9/27/12), the Milwaukee WI Sikh temple (8/5/12) and the Aurora CO movie theatre (7/20/12) shootings represent a set of diverse venues and victims. Besides their unpredictability, these shooting have been noted for the use of military style assault weapons and high capacity magazines. Although only the Sikh temple shooting likely qualifies as terrorism, it is doubtful that the public makes such a distinction (Martin, 2013). These shootings have reopened the debate about gun control, spurred at least some state-level gun control legislation (New York), and raised the public consciousness about the unpredictable dangers that lurk in our society. Distinguishing between threats from traditional, ideologically driven terrorists and threats from angry gunmen may be more academic than practical, especially since the task of the early responders may be about the same; there may be a need for a new analytic category to cover these terrorist-like attacks.

Focus of Present Research

The preceding review raises a number of interrelated questions about the war on terror. How do people view this war today? Do they see a need for more or less security in public spaces? Do counter-terrorism measures affect individuals’ behavior, especially with respect to the decision to attend events in public venues? What is the relationship between support for gun control measures and concerns about terrorism? Do individual level (personality) variables affect responses to the war on terror? These questions were addressed by a relatively brief (five-page; 15 minute) survey of a diverse group of subjects.

Survey Methodology

The primary purpose of this research was to test the hypothesis that concerns about terrorism and awareness of counter-terrorism measures affect the decision about attending a pop culture event (a concert). This hypothesis was tested in two ways, one experimental and one correlational. The experimental test involved randomly assigning subjects to receive one of four descriptions of a concert, with the description varying the presence of a threat and the level of security to be provided. The correlational test involved subjects’ self report of the extent to which concerns over possible terrorism had caused them to not attend various events during the previous five years. This self report was treated as a dependent (criterion) variable, with subjects’
concern about terrorism and various personality and attitudinal variables as independent (predictor) variables. This research, then, involved soliciting suitable samples to fill out a questionnaire. Questionnaire construction is described immediately below, followed by a description of the sampling process.

**Questionnaire Construction**

A five-page questionnaire was preceded by a one-page cover letter informing subjects of the general purpose of the research: to look at “how people view various general security related issues, especially concerning various terrorist threats.” Subjects were promised anonymity and advised that participation was voluntary. The questionnaire itself began with a measure of several demographic variables. Demographic variables were measured both to describe the sample and to use as control variables. These variables included: age, gender, education level, race/ethnicity, residence, and employment status. A number of separate samples were used for this research (see below). Samples were obtained from the Detroit and New York City metro areas; it was originally assumed that because of the events of 9/11, New Yorkers would have a stronger emotional reaction to terrorism issues. (This proved not to be the case.)

**Manipulation of Security and Threat Level**

The main purpose of the questionnaire was to measure the effect of level of threat and level of security on a subject’s decision to attend a concert. Two scenarios were created, each involving the opportunity to attend a concert. The first of these was designed to create a baseline measure of how likely it was that a subject would attend a concert. **Scenario 1** was worded as follows:

A new group has been getting some good reviews on a new CD they have released on the internet. The musical style is one you normally like. Two friends tell you that this group will be playing an unscheduled appearance at Hart Plaza this evening and they want you to go with them. Tickets are only $10 and will be sold at the event. (Hart Plaza is an outdoor venue by the Detroit Riverfront that holds about 5,000 for a concert.) The concert is not likely to sell out, but your friends want to get there at least an hour early in order to get a decent seat. You have nothing planned for the evening, which is forecast to be clear and in the mid 70s.

**How likely is it that you would attend (assume no other information is available).**

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**Scenario 2** was designed to measure the effect of variations in threat and security levels. This scenario had four variations. **Scenario 2A** (low threat, low security) made no mention of any threat and the security was normal or basic. It was expected that responses to this scenario would not differ significantly from responses to the first scenario given above. **Scenario 2A** was worded as follows:

A major concert will be playing in Comerica Park. One of the goals of the concert is to raise money for a local memorial commemorating Michigan citizens who died in either Iraq or Afghanistan. The group is one you have always wanted to see. The 40,000 tickets sold out before you had a chance to buy one but a friend has an extra ticket and invites you to go along. After checking the internet you learn that the Detroit Police Department has authorized some overtime and the level of security will be about the same as it is for a Tiger game. [Italics not in original.]

**How likely is it that you would attend (assume no other information is available).**

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Three alternative versions of Scenario 2 were created. **Scenario 2B** (high threat, low security) the following wording replaced the italicized section in 2A.

After checking the internet you learn that some group calling itself “al Qaida in the Americas” has promised something dramatic to disrupt the event. State and Federal officials doubt that the threat is serious, and the event will go on as scheduled. The Detroit Police Department has authorized some overtime and the level of security will be about the same as it is for a Tiger game.

In **Scenario 2C** (low threat, high security) the following wording replaced the italicized section in 2A.

After checking the internet you learn that the threat level for this event is considered to be low. Nevertheless, a high level of security will be in
place for the event simply because of the event’s symbolic importance. It is specifically mentioned that all patrons will pass through airport quality body scanners and all purses or other bags and packs will be searched. No potential weapons, liquids, or packages will be allowed. Police officers armed with rifles will patrol the concourses.

In Scenario 2A (high threat, high security) the following wording replaced the italicized section in 2A:
After checking the internet you learn some group calling itself “al Qaida in the Americas” has promised something dramatic to disrupt the event. State and Federal officials doubt that the threat is serious, and the event will go on as planned. Nevertheless, a high level of security will be in place for the event. It is specifically mentioned that all patrons will pass through airport quality body scanners and all purses or other bags and packs will be searched. No potential weapons, liquids, or packages will be allowed. Police officers armed with rifles will patrol the concourses.

A few slight variations were used for the New York City questionnaire. In the first scenario, the reference to Hart Plaza was changed to Central Park. In the second scenario, Comerica Park was changed to Yankee Stadium. Likewise, Tiger became Yankee and the Detroit Police became the New York Police.

It should be noted that there are innumerable levels of threat and security that could have been used. We considered a threat variation in which the threat came from a well known terrorist group and a security variation with snipers visible on the stadium roof. We believed, however, that adding these variations would have created a “demand characteristic” in the sense that any prudent person should avoid a situation with a such high level of threat, and calling attention to snipers would suggest that the situation is seen as dangerous by the authorities regardless of what they say. We felt that the two levels of threat and security that we did employ were a more realistic representation of the types of decisions that subjects were likely to face.

**Personality Variables**

Four personality or attitudinal variables were measured using Likert scales. Subjects used a number from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) to indicate their degree of agreement with 37 items. The specific scales were: impulsiveness, ideology, counter-terrorism, and gun control.

**Impulsiveness** was measured by a 19-item “Impulsive Sensation Seeking” scale taken from Zuckerman (2002), which has been found to correlate with a number of risk taking behaviors. A typical item is worded: “I very seldom spend much time on details or planning ahead.” Scores can range from 19 to 95, with high scores indicating risk taking. The obvious hypothesis is that subjects high on impulsiveness are less affected by concerns over terrorism.

**Ideology** was measured by a 10-item “Criminal Responsibility Scale” that measures whether subjects take a liberal or a conservative outlook on criminal justice and social issues (Homan and Barnes, 2012). A typical item is worded: “We should spend less money on prisons and more money on programs that create real jobs.” The total of the item scores is divided by 10, giving a range of scores can range from 1.0 to 5.0, with high scored indicating a liberal (pro-rehabilitation) outlook. Homan and Barnes (2012) found that those scoring more conservative on this scale supported taking a tough stance toward terrorists (e.g., support of waterboarding), supported the use of cameras to police public spaces, and opposed legalizing marijuana or prostitution. Conservatives also opposed gay marriage and did not believe that global warming was a problem. While we did not anticipate any difference between liberals and conservatives in terms of how much of threat terrorism was, we did expect liberals to be less supportive of adopting harsh measures against terrorism such as the Patriot Act or coercive interrogation. Whether liberals and conservatives would differ in terms of how much a terrorist threat influenced their behavior was an open question.

**Counter-terrorism** was measured by a 4-item scale measuring support for strong measures against possible terrorists. A typical item reads: “Sometimes the war on terrorism requires using harsh methods such as waterboarding to get information from known terrorists.” Two items concerned the desirability of profiling possible terrorists despite the risk of ethnic discrimination and one item involved the desirability of full legal rights for non-citizens suspected of terrorism. Items were keyed in a politically conservative direction, with possible scores ranging from 4 to 20.

**Gun control** was also measured with a 4-item scale keyed in a conservative direction. A typical item read: “The National Rifle Association is correct when it says that the presence of armed security guards is the best way to increase safety in our schools.” There were no specific hypotheses regarding the terrorism and gun control variables; they were included in order to give additional information as to how concerns over terrorism and reactions to security measures may be related to other issues.
Additional Items

Besides the four above variables measured with multiple-item Likert scales, four other one-item scales were included:

**Emotional effect (emotion)** was a 7-point scale worded: “How much did the events of 9-11 affect you emotionally,” with 7 indicating “very strong effect.”

**Terror likelihood (likely)** was also a 7-point scale, worded: “How likely do you feel it is that a terrorist act will occur in the metropolitan area where you live or work some time within the next 6 months?” A 7 indicated “very likely”.

**Patriot Act** was a measure of whether a subject was supportive of the USA PATRIOT Act. A few basic provisions (surveillance, wiretaps, detention, and deportation) were outlined and subjects were given four choices to indicate full support through advocating full repeal. A fifth option allowed the subject to respond in his or her own words.

**Avoidance** was a measure of the extent to which concerns about possible terrorist acts had affected a subject’s behavior in the past. The subject was asked whether he or she had ever “decided not to attend an event because of concerns over a possible terrorist attack (such as a parade, fireworks display, sporting event, concert, public ceremony, etc)?” If so, the subject was asked the number of times and the most significant example. This variable was the dependent variable for the correlational aspect of the research.

Subjects

Subjects for this study were obtained through a variety of convenience samples. The ultimate goal was to get a diverse sample, both in terms of demographics and likelihood of concern about terrorism issues. Two groups were sampled in Detroit: Introduction to Sociology students (n = 115) and graduate criminal justice and intelligence analysis students (n = 140). Two groups were sampled in New York: Introduction to Sociology students (n = 50), and elementary school teachers (n = 50). This last group was recruited in part from the teaching staff at an elementary school and in part from a graduate level class in education. Except for the school staff, all subjects were recruited in the classroom and given approximately 15 minutes at the end of a class period to fill out the questionnaire. Teaching staff were contacted at work and asked if they wanted to participate. All were assured that participation was both voluntary and anonymous as to who did or did not return a questionnaire. Virtually all classroom students returned a questionnaire, though 13 were eventually discarded because key questions were missed. About 60% of the teaching staff returned a questionnaire.

Results

**Demographics**

Sample demographics are shown in Table 1 below, along with a few baseline variables that the groups were expected to differ on. The sample as whole could be characterized as young (mean age 23.0) and disproportionately female (65%) and ethnic minorities (55%). About 2/3 were employed. More specifically with respect to race/ethnicity, 17% declined to answer the question. Of those who did answer, 45% were white (but not Hispanic or middle eastern), 19% were Hispanic, 17% were black, 11% middle eastern (including Indian or Pakistani), 11% Asian, and 1% other. The groups did not differ significantly in terms of whether they would attend the concert described in scenario 1; otherwise they differed on all other variables in Table 1 (by analysis of variance). The two New York samples were significantly more liberal on the criminal responsibility scale; the (younger) sociology samples were less affected by the events of 9/11; the (New York) teachers were more concerned about the likelihood of a terrorist event.

![Table 1. Sample Demographics.](image-url)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Employ</th>
<th>Concert</th>
<th>CRS</th>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Likely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crim Just</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age ranged from 18 to 61; mean scores are given above. “Female” and “minority” represent the percentage of sample or subsample. “Employ” refers to having a full time job. CRS refers to the criminal responsibility scale: mean score is given on a 1 to 5 scale with high scores representing the liberal direction. “Concert” is the percentage of subjects indicating a high likelihood
(1, 2, or 3 on scale of 7) of attending the concert in Scenario 1. “Emotion” is the percentage of subjects who indicated that 9/11 had a strong emotional effect on them (5, 6, or 7 on scale of 7). “Likely” is the percentage of subjects who indicate that a terrorist act is likely to occur in their area (5, 6, or 7 on scale of 7).

**Effect of Threat and Security**

The main question for this research was whether altering the levels of threat and security at an event would affect people’s perceived likelihood of attending, which we will refer to simply as “attendance.” Relevant findings on this question are shown in Table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2A Basic</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B Threat</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2C Security</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D Threat + Security</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 287. Likelihood of attendance was measured on a 7-point scale, with low numbers indicating a higher likelihood. “Attendance” indicates the percentage of the group choosing a 1, 2, or 3 on the 7-point scale indicating the likelihood that they would attend the concert (where “4” indicated “not sure”).

Anova: F = 16.86 (df 3/283) p < .001

Note that because “version” was randomly assigned within each subject group, there is no concern that differences between groups might have affected results. As one would expect, there was a clear “threat effect”. Subjects were much less likely to say that they would attend the concert given a threat from “al Qaeda in the Americas.” In the baseline version (2A), 68% of the subjects indicated that they were likely to attend. The percentage was slightly higher for the security version (2C): 71%. But for the two threat versions, 2B and 2C, likelihood of attending dropped to 36% and 24% respectively. An analysis of variance comparing the four groups is highly significant: F = 16.86 (df 3/283, p < .001). By Scheffe post hoc comparisons, the two low threat groups (2A and 2C) showed a highly significant difference (p < .001) from the two high threat groups (2B and 2D). However, neither of the security groups (2C and 2D) differs from its corresponding low security group.

The effect of security raises a possible question. Although increasing security did not have a significant effect on likelihood of attending the event, an examination of the means for the four versions in Table 2 suggests a possible effect for further investigation. In the “no threat” conditions (2A and 2C), there is a slight trend for security to increase likelihood of attendance (from 68% to 71%); in the threat conditions (2B and 2D), however, participation drops from 36% to 24% in the higher security condition. The logic here could be that the promised security served as a cue that the vague threat was indeed being taken seriously. It must be stressed that this possible interaction effect is far from statistical significance and is pointed to here only as a suggestion for further exploration. (A de-briefing with 35 Detroit sociology students failed to find any support for this negative effect of higher security.)

The pattern of results shown in Table 2 held for all 4 subsamples; in each case the effect of threat was statistically significant in lowering expected attendance. Also, in each case the effect of security showed a (non-significant) trend toward making the threat worse. In three of the subsamples, security slightly increased likely attendance when there was no threat; with the fourth subsample (Detroit sociology), the trend was for more security to decrease participation with or without a threat.

**Terrorism Avoidance**

Besides the experimental study of how threats and security affect participation, we also had subjects report on how often they had decided “not to attend an event because of concerns over a terrorist attack.” In total, 48 subjects (17%) indicated that they had avoided one or more events because of concern over terrorism. Subject listed ten different types of events and places that they had avoided. Six subjects (five Detroiters) mentioned fireworks (a major annual event for Detroit); eight subjects (all New Yorkers) mentioned either parades or New Year’s celebrations—one Detroit mentioned Times Square, but did not indicate a specific occasion. Concerts, movies, sporting events and travel were each mentioned by two or more subjects. Only three subjects indicated that they had skipped more than 2 events; therefore, “avoidance” was re-coded as a yes/no (dichotomous) variable. There was no significant difference among the four subsamples; 17% of both New Yorkers and Detroiters avoided events in the previous five years because of terrorism concerns.

**Avoidance as a Predictor of Attendance**
The avoidance question specifically asked whether subjects had avoided an event because of concerns over terrorism. It was expected that this question would be predictive of how strongly subjects avoided the concert described in scenario 2, especially in the presence of a terrorist threat (versions 2B and 2D). This proved to be the case. Avoidance was predictive of lower attendance for both scenario 1 \( r = .12, df = 277, p = .05 \) and scenario 2 \( r = .20, df = 277, p < .001 \). In looking just at the threat scenarios (2B and 2D), the correlation between avoidance and lower likelihood of attending reached +.26 \( df = 139, p = .002 \). In practical terms, this meant that only 12% of the avoidance group would have attended the concert under threat conditions.

**Predictors of Avoidance**

Some demographic and background factors distinguished subjects who had avoided events from those who had not (see Table 3).

Table 3. **Predictors of Avoidance and the Patriot Act**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Avoidance</th>
<th>Patriot Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City (NY)</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.196***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (older)</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>-.164**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>.153**</td>
<td>-.083**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (higher)</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>-.208***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional (g/11)</td>
<td>.193***</td>
<td>.055**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely terrorism</td>
<td>.246****</td>
<td>-.211**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impulsive (risk taking)</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>-.372***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal responsibility</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.372***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.400***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun control</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.185**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R</td>
<td>.309***</td>
<td>.538***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N’s range from 263 to 287.

Positive correlations indicate increased avoidance and increased support for the Patriot Act. The criminal responsibility scale is scored with high scores indicating a liberal tendency. Terrorism refers to support for counter-terrorism measures such as enhanced interrogation.

\* \( p < .05 \); \** \( p < .01 \); \*** \( p < .001 \)

Avoiders were more likely to be: older \( r = .14, df = 269, p = .019 \) and female \( r = .15, df = 277, p = .01 \). They reported a stronger emotional effect from 9/11 \( r = .19, df = 277, p < .001 \). They also saw future terrorist events as more likely \( r = .25, df = 277, p < .001 \). They did not differ on educational level or employment, and they were equally likely to be liberal or conservative. They did not differ on impulsiveness and there was no difference on their degree of support for the Patriot Act or other counter-terrorism measures, and they did not differ on support for gun control. Combining the four variables that had a significant relationship with avoidance resulted in a multiple \( R \) of .309 \( F = 7.17, df = 4/271, p < .001 \). Likelihood of a future attack made the largest contribution to the multiple \( R \), followed by emotional response to 9/11. Gender (female) narrowly missed significance \( p = .056 \) and age was no longer significant.

**USA Patriot Act**

The Patriot Act was one of the first official steps in the “war on terror.” Although it has been criticized for too much surrender of legal rights, it has had general support and was renewed by the Obama Administration in 2011. Support for the Patriot Act in this research was measured on a 4-point scale, with 4 indicating complete support for the act and 1 indicating opposition to the act. It must be stressed that the subjects in this research should not be viewed as representative of all people from the Detroit and New York areas. Nevertheless, it is a diverse sample and looking at factors that influence support for the Patriot Act within the sample may be instructive as to how people view possible steps in the fight against terrorism. In our total sample, 18% strongly supported the Patriot Act, 45% were basically supportive, 31% believed the Act was reasonable at the time but need repeal or significant amendment, and 6% were flatly opposed to the Act. These responses were treated as a 4-point continuous (Likert) scale. For ease of reporting, a 3 or 4 response will be categorized as supporting the act.

The Detroit criminal justice sample (86% support) was significantly more supportive of the act than were the other three samples (59% support): \( F = 7.84, 3/261, p < .001 \). Race/ethnicity did not significantly affect support for the Patriot Act, though there was a clear tendency for the small group \( n = 14 \) classified “middle eastern” to be lower on support than the rest of the subjects: (36% versus 66%).

Subjects with higher education were more supportive of the Patriot Act \( r = .21, df = 263, p < .001 \), which may also explain a positive correlation with age \( r = .16, df = 261, p = .008 \). There was no relation to gender. Although support for the Patriot Act was not related to whether the subject avoided events because of concern about terrorism, it was significantly related to the perceived likelihood of a terrorist event \( r = .21, df = 263, p < .001 \). Supporters tended to be conservative on gun control \( r = .19, df = 263, p = .003 \) and low on impulsiveness \( r = .132, df = 263, p = .03 \). They scored very conservative on the
criminal responsibility scale ($r = .37, df 263, p < .001$) and they also supported generally harsh approaches toward suspected terrorists ($r = .40, df 263, p < .001$).

When significant predictors of support for the Patriot Act are combined, a multiple R of .538 is obtained ($F = 12.659, df 8/249, p < .001$). The strongest contribution to the multiple R was made by the criminal responsibility scale (conservative), followed by the terrorism scale (supporting harsh methods), higher education, and terrorist events seen as more likely.

**Discussion**

This research explored subjects’ decisions to attend or avoid a pop culture event, as represented by a scenario in which they were invited to attend a concert. The presence of a vague terrorist threat lowered subjects’ attendance at the concert from 68% to 36%. When a high level of security was promised, the attendance dropped to 24%, we believe because the additional security made the threat seem more serious. When the concert was accompanied by more security without any stated threat, attendance stayed high (71%).

Subjects also reported whether they had avoided events because of terrorism concerns. Seventeen percent of the subjects reported that they had avoided an event during the previous five years. Subjects who had previously avoided possible terrorism were more responsive to the terrorist threat in the concert scenario, with only 12% of this group being likely to attend the concert, compared to 71% for those who had not avoided an event and there was no threat. Avoiding an event was found to be related to being female, being older, having been emotionally affected by 9/11, and believing that a terrorist event was likely to happen somewhere in their city in the coming months. But avoidance was not related to support for the Patriot Act, to support for other counter-terrorism measures, or to support for gun control.

Support for the Patriot Act was found to be part of a general conservative orientation, and was embedded in a generally conservative outlook. Thus, it correlated highly with the conservative pole of the criminal responsibility scale, with support for strong anti-terrorism measures (such as waterboarding, profiling, and limiting legal rights) and with support for gun control. The criminal responsibility scale (liberal) also showed $r = -.362$ (df 285, $p < .001$) with anti-terrorism and $r = +.271$ (df 285, $p < .001$) with gun control. As expected, the New York samples were significantly more liberal than the Detroit samples on these variables. Supporters of the Patriot Act did share with those high on avoidance the fact that they were more likely to be older and to believe that terrorism was relatively more likely.

**Implications**

We do not take a position on whether it is desirable or not to have most people “carry on” their daily activities by more or less ignoring terrorism threats. Thus, one could argue that the drop in attendance shown in the threat scenarios (Table 2) is unfortunate because the terrorist “wins” without having to even do anything, or, conversely, that the drop shows awareness and prudence on the part of subjects—why attend a discretionary event if there is no need to and there is a possible threat?

Likewise the failure of security measures to affect attendance can be seen as either positive or negative. One might argue that increased security, other things being equal, should make people more comfortable, and therefore more likely to attend. It is possible that the level of security described in versions 2C and 2D was high enough that some may have opted out in order to avoid possible delays and/or intrusiveness. It seems more likely to us, however, that the notice of extra security mainly served to reinforce the possible threat and that this accounts for the slight decrease in attendance from scenario 2B to scenario 2D. Using heightened security as a cue to discount the claim that “city and federal officials doubt that the threat is serious” strikes us as a reasonably social judgment. The fact that only 17% of both the New York and the Detroit samples indicated a smattering of venues that they had avoided in the previous five years certainly indicates that the subjects in this study were not greatly overreacting to the war on terrorism in their daily lives.

**Further Research**

A variable that “kept showing up” in our analysis was subjects’ perceived likelihood of a terrorist attack in their metro area in the next 6 months. The mid-point of this 7-point scale, a 4, was anchored as “could happen”. The high end of the scale, 7, was anchored as “very likely.” Thirty-two subjects (11%) checked a 5, 6, or 7, which we summarized as responding “likely”. (The vast majority of these, 23 subjects, answered “5”. ) Seventy-nine subjects (28%) answered “4”, the modal response. The likelihood variable was found to have an interesting pattern of relationships with the other variables. It was predictive of being less likely to attend in all versions of scenario 2, of being
more likely to have shown past avoidance, and of being more supportive of the Patriot Act. Some demographic variables correlated with likelihood (female, older, higher educated, New Yorker), but there was no correlation with the criminal responsibility scale or with attitude toward gun control. Perhaps this variable mainly reflects the concept of (low) optimism bias that was investigated by Caponecchia (2012). In any event, more research into the origin of how people make judgments about the likelihood of terrorism might be instructive for understanding people’s choices of cultural activities to attend.

References


On Killing: The Changing World of Youth, Violence, and Gun Culture

Zina T. McGee*
Hampton University

Introduction

On December 14, 2013, twenty children suffered unimaginable deaths due to a heinous gun shooting. The Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in Newtown, CT provoked public anxiety and renewed consideration of the current laws pertaining to school safety in America. However, shootings on school campuses are not new in the United States. For example, during the 1990s, a 16-year-old student in Mississippi killed his mother and then proceeded to kill nine students attending the school (Burns & Crawford, 1999). Weeks later, a 14 year old male targeted and killed a group of students in a prayer group in Kentucky, leaving three students dead and five wounded. In Arkansas, two boys 11 and 13, during the spring of 1998, deliberately activated the fire alarm in West Side High School, and as the children exited the building they began opening fire on the crowd. Similarly, in Oregon, a teenager entered a cafeteria at a high school and injured twenty-two students, killing two, while in Pennsylvania a teacher was wounded with two classmate at the hands of another student (Burns & Crawford, 1999). In April 1999, two students in Columbine opened fired resulting in the death of a teacher and twelve classmates before committing suicide. Almost ten years later, on the college campus of Virginia Tech, a student opened fire killing classmates and teachers in the worst shooting massacre the United States has experienced, leaving more than 30 individuals dead in the largest school massacre the country has seen. In response to the Sandy Hook school shooting, President Obama has promised to make gun control part of the central focus of his administration, and hearings are continuously being held at both the state and federal levels to discuss methods and strategies for prevention. At the same time, there has been a huge increase in the sales of powerful handguns, assault weapons and ammunition in response to the renewed interest in gun control legislation (Miktka, 2013). The current article presents an evaluation of the efforts of United States legislation to combat violence, with attention being placed on juvenile gun crimes, and the extent to which some laws may place new responsibilities on mental health care professionals in light of the Sandy Hook school shootings.

The History of Legislation to Combat Gun Violence

Legislation has been enacted for years to assist in alleviating the violence occurring on school property. The Guns-Free Schools Act (GFSA) was passed in 1994 in connection with the Improving America’s Schools Act. The act mandated states to legally punish students who bring or have a firearm at school to be expelled for a year or more. The act was passed when the rate of violent crimes at school increased to 13 incidents per 1,000 students. Federally, the GFSA was established to target firearms but given the states’ rights to individually enforce it, many also included such offenses such as making threats, assaulting teachers, and selling drugs. Subsequently, the zero tolerance movement promoted the development of various policies that sought to enforce severe sanctions for minor offenses with the intent of combating more serious offenses. However, these policies have been widely criticized. It has been argued that the legitimacy is flawed because the interventions are contrary to the principles of children’s healthy development, while others have argued that racial disproportionality regarding sentencing has been applied. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 required states to develop policies allowing a student to attend a safer school in the district if the student was at a persistently dangerous school or was a victim of a violent crime as defined by the individual state. The Unsafe School Option, did not establish a criteria for states to define a formal definition of a dangerous schools or time frame for the students to transfer to a safe school.

Over the years, there have been mixed results pertaining to the effectiveness of such acts and how they are measured. The U.S. Department of Education (1998) data indicated that less than two percent of principals in public schools ranked weapon possession, drug distribution, and physical assaults as serious or moderate problems in their schools. The GFSA data indicated that between 1999-2000, of an estimated forty-nine million students in public schools, five percent of students were caught with possession of a weapon. In support of the national data, Kaufman et al. (2001) found that in 1995 nine percent of students between the ages of 12-18 had a fear of an attack
or harm at school; this number decreased in 1999 by five percent. Students in grades 9-12, between 1993-1999, reported that carrying a gun on school property increased from 7 to 12 percent. In reference to school safety, students between the ages of 12-18 years old who once avoided certain places on campus increased by 4 percent. Kingery and Alford (2000) contended the data exclusively reported students who were caught with a weapon at school and not near school grounds, limiting the analysis to students on the expulsion list, misrepresenting the entire population of youth who possess weapons on campus grounds and near school grounds. Also, after more than a year of declining numbers, 2000-2001 data revealed a 29 percent increase in the number of students who have reported carrying a weapon within the past six months.

As the debates continue regarding the most effective strategies to curb gun violence affecting America's youth, injuries remain the biggest threat to U.S. children over 1 year of age. In 2010, gun-related injuries accounted for 6570 deaths of children and young people (1 to 24 years of age). That includes 7 deaths per day among people 1 to 19 years of age. Gun injuries cause twice as many deaths as cancer, 5 times as many as heart disease, and 15 times as many as infections. In efforts to prevent gun injuries, scholars have examined the behaviors that place children and adolescents at high risk, and the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) recognized vulnerabilities such as depression, mental illness, child abuse and bullying, and declared in a policy statement on firearms in October 2012 that “the absence of guns from homes and communities is the most effective measure to prevent suicide, homicide, and unintentional injuries to children and adolescents.” In the early 1990s, there was a flood of violence and firearm-related deaths. The death rate was so high (nearly 28 of every 100,000 people 15 to 19 years of age) that physicians joined with other professionals (police officers, clergy, and educators) to find ways to combat the epidemic. The physicians began to address the protection of children from gun-related causes alongside the prevention of other types of injuries, poisonings, child abuse, lead toxicity, and infectious diseases. Although they argue that screening is important in general, they have noted that it is particularly important that children's health care providers have the opportunity (and time) to discuss the issue of guns with the families of children and young people who have developmental, behavioral, or mental health problems (Caplan et al., 2013). In the United States, for example, it has been contended that far too little attention is paid to the seriousness of children's mental health problems. Families are often left unverified as they try to protect their children who may be depressed, impetuous, or antagonistic. The Newtown tragedy is inciting a national understanding of the pervasive threats that guns pose and the toll they take. While Newtown concentrated the horror in one place for one hour, the same outrage occurs daily in U.S. cities, suburbs, and rural areas.

For example, regarding urban gun violence, a recent court ruling and heightened concerns about violence in areas of Chicago presses for tougher sanctions against people who illegally carry weapons in public. It will develop a process to allow qualified residents to carry concealed weapons legally. Gun owners would have to be at least 21 years old, pass a background check and take a firearms training course. Further, guns could not be brought into schools, taverns, casinos, most public buildings, sports stadiums and airports. Moreover, businesses could prohibit concealed weapons on their property, advancing a comprehensive bill that permits concealed carry and makes it harder for guns to end up in the wrong hands by cracking down on “straw” purchasers, or people who buy guns legally and resell them to criminals, to provide a chance to create a greater deterrence for criminals who buy, sell and carry firearms with little fear of landing in prison. There is also the move to increase penalties for those who commit serious gun crimes. Felons who get caught with a gun would serve three years behind bars. Repeat offenders would be sent away for five years, and those offenders would serve at least 85 percent of their sentence. The would also be a new ordinance that requires gun owners to report lost or stolen weapons within 48 hours to the county sheriff and passed a similar ordinance with fairly stiff penalties for failing to notify police when a gun is lost or stolen. The hope is that such rules will help with tracking the illegal movement of guns. There is opportunity for agreement that protects gun rights and targets gun violence. Similarly, in Boston the government is proposing tougher gun laws to help curb youth violence in a bill that would tighten existing gun laws by giving police new criminal sanctions and investigative tools to stop the proliferation of guns and gangs.

Legislation, Gun Violence, and Victimization among Youth

These proposed changes have great relevance since studies consistently show that youth in America today have access to, are using, and are being victimized by firearms more than ever before. Deaths caused by juveniles using guns increased fourfold during the 10 years between 2002 and 2012. In addition, the heightened accessibility of large-caliber guns has increased the likelihood of a victim of an assault being seriously injured or killed as a result of a gunshot wound. While a broader debate over gun control of assault weaponry is being
waged in this country, discussion concerning juveniles and firearms has centered upon handguns and the need to enact greater limitations on juveniles’ ownership, possession, and use of these weapons. This is of particular importance given the rates of handgun violence in America compared to violence produced by assault weaponry. While some states have responded to this heightened accessibility by maintaining and strengthening current laws restricting the possession, licensing, storage, and transfer of guns to juveniles and by enacting tough new laws for youth who bring guns to school, other states also have enacted laws that allow for prosecution in adult criminal court for those juvenile offenders who allegedly perpetrate certain violent crimes with the use of a firearm.

State laws typically restrict a juvenile’s possession of various firearms based on the age of the juvenile, the activity for which the gun is issued, and the juvenile's previous adjudication as delinquent, if applicable. A survey of State laws enacted through the legislative sessions found that 18 States restrict possession of handguns by youth under the age of 18. Another 14 States prohibit the possession of all firearms by persons under age 18, with various exceptions, including involvement in authorized recreational or educational activities or participation in firearm safety courses. Some states enacted a law that allows youth more than 10 years of age to possess firearms when hunting if they are accompanied by a parent or another adult approved by a parent or guardian (Makarios et al., 2012). Further, adjudicated delinquents are prevented from possessing firearms in some states, with restrictions usually placed on those youth who were adjudicated delinquent for acts that would be considered felonious offenses if they had been committed by an adult. Other states prohibit possession of a firearm for a specific period of time (usually 10 years) after an offender’s adjudication or release from juvenile detention, while other possession restrictions remain in place until the Governor or a court orders the restoration of the right to possess a firearm. Still other measures provide an enhanced penalty for juveniles previously adjudicated delinquent if they are found in possession of a firearm.

Over the years, restricting licensing and imposing liability for the transfer – by sale, gift, or loan – of a firearm to a youth are other tactics states have used to keep firearms out of the hands of children. Some states regulate the age at which a person may obtain a license to carry certain types of firearms, while others prohibit the transfer of firearms to minors, with specific exceptions. Many of these states’ laws allow for enhanced penalties when an individual is found guilty of more than one transfer offense. Other states have taken action to hold parents liable when youth gain access to a family firearm.

These types of "safe storage" or "child access prevention" laws have been enacted with increasing frequency in state legislative sessions in an effort to promote accountability when family firearms are not stored securely. The creation of "gun-free schools" and "safety zones" are yet other ways States have, in recent years, protected children, teachers, and school staff from gun violence on school grounds. Some relevant statistics indicate that gun violence on school grounds has become increasingly prevalent and disruptive. Examples of these statistics include:

The number of guns confiscated in California public schools has doubled. High schools experienced the greatest increase in the number of confiscations, but more guns were found at all grade levels, including elementary school.

In a national survey conducted in 2010, one of every thirty-six 10th-grade boys said they had carried a handgun to school in the past year. One in every one hundred boys brought that gun to school every day. In one U.S. city, one out of every fifteen 11th-grade boys had carried a handgun to school at some point.

In a survey of 10 high schools in four states, 15 percent of inner-city high school students said they were scared at school almost all the time.

A state survey of laws affecting juvenile access to firearms identified several types of statutes under which weapons possession in schools or safety zones is criminalized. The most common type of statute, in place in at least 33 States, prohibits the possession of a weapon on school property or in a safety zone and provides punishments for violations whether or not the offender knowingly possesses the weapon in that restricted area. As a result of legislative action taken, such a statute recently was enacted in Tennessee, where students are prohibited from possessing unauthorized firearms on school property. Policymakers in Delaware in that same year created the crime of "possession of a weapon in a safe-school recreation zone," which forbids possessing a firearm on or within 1,000 feet of school property and school vehicles. Other laws that restrict the use of guns on school property or within a safety zone include punishing the knowing possession of a firearm on school property or in a safety zone, punishing those who intend to use firearms on school property, and prohibiting the discharge or attempted discharge of a firearm on school grounds or in a safety zone.
Penalties for violation of a gun-free school provision are varied. A popular sanction in the past 2 years includes suspension or expulsion of a student for possessing weapons on school grounds. A majority of the States’ laws – 19 of which were enacted – mandate expulsion of a student found carrying a weapon on school property. For example, the State of Washington passed a law that requires a 1-year expulsion of students who have been found possessing a firearm on elementary or secondary school premises, while a similar law enacted by policymakers in Oregon mandates expulsion for a year when students bring, use, or possess weapons at school or at interscholastic activities or events. Another law in Illinois provides that a student suspended from school for various acts of delinquency, including possession of a weapon, shall not be permitted to transfer to or attend classes at another school in the district until the term of the suspension or expulsion expires (Sillito et al., 2011).

Other punishments include suspending the driver’s permit of a youth found in violation of a gun-free school zone law. In at least seven States – Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Minnesota, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Utah – a youth may have his or her driver’s license suspended if found possessing a firearm on school grounds. It should be noted that statutes of this type generally have several exceptions or defenses to prosecution. The most common exceptions are for government agents, students, and staff who are participating in lawful, educational activities. Other exceptions include an individual possessing a firearm with special permission from school authorities, an individual who has a firearm that is safely secured in a motor vehicle that is on school property, an individual who is on private property within the safety zone, an individual who is hunting lawfully, and an individual who has a valid permit to possess a firearm.

**Adult Gun Crimes: The Transference of Juveniles to Criminal Court**

Another popular sanction in recent years allows juveniles to be transferred to criminal court when suspected of committing certain serious and violent acts with a gun. Although every State provides some mechanism for children to be transferred to criminal court for habitually perpetrating crimes or committing specific crimes of violence, several States allow juveniles to be tried in adult court for committing weapons offenses as well. For example, a law in Nevada allows 14-year-old youth who commit an offense that would be considered a felony if committed by an adult to be transferred to an adult criminal court jurisdiction if the offense in question involved the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon. In Indiana, Mississippi, and Oregon, a youth must be prosecuted as an adult if he or she violates a firearm law, while laws in Arkansas, Kansas, and the District of Columbia allow for the transfer of juveniles of statutorily specified ages to be transferred to adult criminal court for violating gun-free school zones. Finally, some States are trying to encourage youth to surrender their weapons in an effort to get guns off the streets. A law in New York creates immunity from prosecution for unlawful possession of a firearm when an individual voluntarily surrenders the weapon to the superintendent of the State police or a designee.

A combination of prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies has been implemented in communities across the United States to address the problem of gangs in relation to gun violence. It is imperative that any program, whether prevention, intervention, suppression, or any combination of these, be based in sound theory and work closely with the juvenile justice system. Specifically, policies and programs must be based on appropriate targeting of both institutions and youth, as well as their relation to each other at a specific time and place. For example, it is important to focus on youth entering or leaving a gang and on the developmental stage of the gang problem. Some programs have provided an assessment of youth gang research, including definitions, the nature and causes of the youth gang phenomenon, and the effectiveness of the program strategies used by various agencies and organizations in the community (Sillito et al., 2011). The need for conclusive evaluations of these strategies was emphasized, but the following common elements appear to be associated with the sustained reduction of gang problems:

- Leaders must recognize that gangs are present in the community and that suppression strategies must be complemented by prevention and intervention strategies that include provisions to combat gun violence.
- Community leaders must reach a consensus on the nature of the problem and the critical points for intervention including curbing gun violence.
- The combined leadership of the justice system and community-based organizations must focus on the mobilization of political and community resources to address gang and gun problems.
- Leaders must create a mechanism or structure to coordinate communitywide efforts.
- A team comprising representatives from law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, probation, corrections, schools, community-based
organizations, grassroots agencies, and other groups must prepare a set of policies and practices for the design and mobilization of community efforts to curb gun violence.

Gun Legislation and the Mental Health System

The mental health status of many school shooters, including the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooter, remains at the forefront of many discussions in investigative attempts to understand the events and patterns that often lead to such crimes. Developmental, behavioral, or mental health problems often serve as precursors to the planning and execution of mass killings as evidenced by examinations of medical records of the accused in the aftermath of their crimes. As noted earlier, in United States it has been argued that far too little attention is paid to the seriousness of children’s mental health problems with regard to gun violence and criminality. As the Newtown tragedy continues to perpetuate the need to further understand the insidious threats that guns pose, parts of legislation that address the role of mental health providers remain the most difficult to implement. For example, while there have been legal obligations in most states that mental health care professionals disclose the threat of violence, there has been less evidence to suggest that many of these professionals are adept at predicting such violence. In addition, studies have shown that those suffering from mental illness are less likely to have access to sustained, documented mental health care (Caplan et al., 2013). In situations where individuals must have serious mental health symptoms prior to accessing care, by then the events may have already occurred and are spiraling out of control. First responders on the scene often have limited training with working with those with impaired mental functioning. In addition, many family members are unaware of the “early warning symptoms” that would possibly prevent gun violence. These problems, coupled with the accessibility of guns among those affected by mental illness, continues to create a recipe for mass gun violence as seen by the background characteristics of the recent school shooters. Without stringent background checks, many suffering from mental illness are able to purchase guns in states that do not limit the number of guns that can purchased at one time, including those purchased at gun shows. Many of these guns are purchased by a disproportionate number of families where there is either criminal history or mental health impairment present, prompting policy makers of late to advocate for intervention programs and violence prevention policies that impose greater monitoring of background checks. Increased bans on the sales of guns, including multiple gun purchases bought on the same day, to those at a greater risk of gun violence, have also been addressed as part of potential legislative initiatives.

Conclusion

As we move toward greater discussion of new legislation to combat violence that involves both assault weaponry and handguns, scholars have noted that at a minimum, several specific measures should be taken. First, some have argued that the ban on assault weapons should be reinstated. Magazine and ammunition capacity and the tissue-destruction capability of ammunition should be limited. Rather than increasing the number of guns in public places, as was recently suggested by the National Rifle Association, others have pointed toward the need to set a goal of reducing the number of guns in our homes and communities (Mitka, 2013). Hence, this reduction can be accomplished through tighter consumer-safety regulations, as well as licensure and certification of gun owners. Federal restrictions on the collection of public health data about gun-related injuries should be reversed. Continued emphasis should be placed on limiting children’s viewing of violent material on TV and through video games. Finally, others have suggested that we must dedicate more state and local funding to effective treatment of young people who are identified by parents, schools, and law-enforcement or mental health professionals as being at high risk for committing interpersonal violent acts. Consistently, we are told that the nation can prevent the loss of precious lives. Although Congress appears to be unlikely to reinstate a federal ban on assault weapons, there does seem to be more support for background checks on all firearms purchases. Federal law that required a background check for private sales and sales at gun shows should help to stem the flow of illegal guns across state lines, possibly curbing some of the violence that continues to plague our nation’s children.
References


The Impact of Transgressive Leisure on Domestic Anti-Terrorism, Security and Police Practice: Geocaching, Public Safety, and Bomb Scares

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Abstract
Geocaching is a computer-based geographically-oriented form of leisure activity that is poorly understood by the public, law enforcement, and security personnel. Although innocuous enough in form and in statements on its website, it possesses potential for considerable disruption through the careless or transgressive placement of geocaches in high security areas or even in normal contexts. Such caches and those placing or searching for geocaches are sometimes reported to security and police agencies by concerned citizens. Bomb squads may be called and expensive and embarrassing incidents might ensue. Moreover, other geocaching practices, which attract the attention of criminal justice and law enforcement agencies, are outlined and discussed. It is suggested that geocachers should use more care in placement and identification of geocaches and that security and police agencies learn how to identify geocaches before overreacting.

Overview
Geocaching is a sport or pastime with over five million members-participants who "log" or find almost eight million "caches" a month (Geocaching.com 2012). Additionally there are over two million active hidden cache sites or geocaches. Thus, the sheer frequency of these recreational geocache placements and their frequent subsequent seeking and discovery by other geocachers represents significant contexts for police and recreation seekers to come into contact and potentially into conflict on a daily basis. Geocaches placed in populated areas, and in rural locales or near bridges, government buildings or in areas frequented by tourists are frequently encountered by land managers, park officials and law enforcement agents. As indicated in Box 1, they are frequently misidentified as bombs, set off bomb scares, and are then preemptively exploded by bomb squads. Many of these events however, represent considerable sources of embarrassment to security and police agencies, and are never reported to the press and hence, never find their way into public or scholarly notice.

Box 1
A Typical Geocaching Misadventure
May 5—The middle-aged couple who prompted the evacuation of Fairview High School two weeks ago after they were seen burying an orange tackle box wrapped in duct tape near the entrance of the school will not be criminally charged in the incident, Boulder police announced this morning.

Police spokeswoman Sarah Huntley said the couple, who found a hidden box buried near the school as part of a popular quest known as geocaching, had no idea that they had created a stir at the high school.

"We believe that they were unaware of the hubbub that they created," she said.

The names of the man and woman involved in the geocache brouhaha were not released Monday as the case is still considered open by police.

The incident occurred on April 20, the 10th anniversary of the massacre at Columbine High School. Huntley said it was initially called in as a bomb threat.

The box, a cache called "A Knight’s View," was buried by Fairview social studies teacher Darrell Billington two years ago.

Police blew it up in the event it contained explosives, Huntley said.

She said the man involved in the incident contacted her after seeing a Boulder police press release about the scare on a geocaching Web site. She said the couple, who drove around in an SUV with Nevada plates, is not from Colorado. (Aguilarr, 2009).

Almost all these incidents could be averted if those who placed the "caches" or those searching for them would exercise better judgment when placing or searching. Police and security personnel, if better informed, could identify geocaches as such and avoid expensive and embarrassing exercises such as building evacuations and bomb squad alerts. Both police and geocachers could avoid ridicule by the press and general community. Geocachers, it should be noted however, often engage in borderline transgressive cache placement (Hawley 2010) at times to increase the discomfort of the cache “seeker” and in order to enhance the thrill of the pastime.
What exactly is geocaching? Though scholarly writing is surprisingly lacking on this subject, O’Hara (2008) has written a fine account of geocaching in the United Kingdom and Hawley (2010) has described the pastime while outlining forms of geocaching deemed as “deviant” by North American geocachers themselves. Still the activity awaits a detailed academic description and analysis. Those who want more details must go to the geocaching.com website or the popular press.

Described in press reports as a “high tech treasure hunt” or “scavenger hunt” geocaching involves an individual geocacher placing a container, in which a log is secreted, in a specific geographic location, logging that location on a GPS receiver, and finally posting that location on the geocaching.com website. Once posted on the website then other geocachers are able to note the location, transcribe or electronically transfer the coordinate to their own GPS device or GPS-equipped cell phone, and commence to search in the field for the geocache. “Paperless” geocaching, which involves putting all or some cache information on cell phones equipped with GPS has become a prominent form of geocaching in recent years. Geocachers claim that the process of the search itself is the goal of the geocacher; that is, being in nature, solving a problem, enjoying the hike, etc., are worthy and family-oriented pastimes. However, the reality of the situation is that a transgressive, agonistic element exists in the activity, and for many more competitively-minded “cachers,” running up an impressive total of “finds” is, in fact, a preeminent latent, though not officially endorsed, goal. And as Rojek (1999) points out, leisure, in general, “is one of the indispensable sites for the emergence and dissemination of antinomial values. Unlike work, leisure takes place in relatively low-surveillance contexts...[where] the culture encourages people to be relaxed, to speak their minds, and be themselves” (p. 87). In this sense “antinomial” means being opposed to conventional social and work roles, rules, legalism and labels. That some sites where caches are placed are hardly “low surveillance” with the advent of closed circuit televisions in many public places is beside the larger point. That is, leisure activities, such as geocaching, have the potential to invert, distort, and defy the rules of the workplace, and as “the nonwork alternative” (Hawley 2010) are generally subversive and often transgressive or at least possess a critical subtext. And at times, even seemingly innocuous recreational pastimes such as geocaching can have serious consequences for security agencies and police who are charged with preventing terrorism and dealing with suspicious persons, actions and physical items. Providing orientation to familiarize police and security personnel with geocaching and other terrestrially-oriented but computer-based games. such as letterboxing, would alleviate some possible problems. Such orientations could be online or presented by geocachers.

Geocaches themselves can be tiny or quite large, but usually range in size from a 35mm film container to a .50 caliber ammunition can, the latter ideally containing items for trade. “Trade” in this usage would refer to the “finder” replacing a trinket from within the box left by the cache owner or previous cached for one of more or less equal value. Most importantly, in this context, all caches must contain a paper log so that the seeking geocacher can demonstrate having actually physically found and accessed the cache by signing and dating the same. Signing the cache log in the field is as critical as is later logging the cache at the geocaching.com website. The physically transgressive act of finding and logging a cache undetected, particularly in a public place, under the noses of unsuspecting “muggles” or non-cachers, is considered crucial and is highly satisfying to geocachers (Hawley 2010). This is closely related to Best and Luckenbill’s (1982) “surreptitious exploitation” in which “the offender [sic] uses stealth to take or damage the target’s property without the target becoming aware of the loss while it occurs...[T]he offender uses stealth to enter the target’s territory, take or destroy the property kept there, and leave without the target’s awareness.” (p. 170) The notion, often put forth by bachers, that they are unaware of the potential for disruption that an unsuspected geocache can cause muggles and law enforcement agents, is, therefore, somewhat suspect as almost all are aware of past incidents such as that described above. In addition it is known that certain geocachers sometimes purposely place caches in risky or marginal spots in order to place other geocachers in a posture of some discomfiture when searching for, logging, or replacing the cache. The fact is, such “agonistic” recreation only heightens the frisson enjoyed by competitive geocachers (Hawley 2010). Such exciting, though non-criminal transgression, is virtually identical to Katz’s (1988) "sneaky thrills." Rojek (1999) in fact points out that all such pastimes and leisure have an essentially “transgressive element.” This sort of “transgressive agonism” is also common to the motivation of some criminal activity (Hawley 2010). But in any event, certainly setting caches in ammunition containers in even deserted locales deep in the woods can bring official reaction. When caches are placed in government centers or near high-security sites without permission it can set reactive procedures in motion. In response to many incidents such as that described above, the geocaching.com website has an official policy of allowing police and park officials free memberships and access to their services. That means that such agencies can see when and where new geocaches pop up as well as helping them locate all existing
caches. Moreover, a concerned police officer or land manager can obtain a pamphlet with geocaching information or online information at http://www.geocaching.com/parksandpolice. In addition law enforcement agencies can contact geocaching.com for information for information about specific geocaches in order to determine if an object is or is not a geocache. On a quotidian level individual officers can download a data set of all geocachers in their area to a GPS unit or computer program on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis and thus have prior knowledge of all geocache placements. This operation takes less than a minute. The officer or agency could notify cache “owners” themselves if the placement of the cache seemed in any way problematic from the perspective of public safety or terrorism prevention.

Placing of geocaches in certain high-risk or inappropriate places or using certain methods to hide them violates the rules of geocaching.com and is generally not practiced. See Box 2 for officially endorsed rules of cache placement. One can see from these rules that geocachers take a public posture of risk-avoidance and responsibility. Schools and playgrounds are generally avoided so that geocachers, often solitary males, will not be considered as potential sexual predators.

Box 2

Inappropriate Cache Placements

[Caches may not be place in the following contexts]

“Caches on land maintained by the U.S. National Park Service or U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (National Wildlife Refuges).

Caches that are buried. If a shovel, trowel or other “pointy” object is used to dig, whether in order to hide or to find the cache, then it is not appropriate.

Caches that deface public or private property, whether a natural or man-made object, in order to provide a clue or a logging method.

Caches placed on archaeological or historical sites. In most cases these areas are highly sensitive to the extra traffic that would be caused by vehicles and humans.

Caches hidden in close proximity to active railroad tracks.

In general we use a distance of 150 ft but your local area’s trespassing laws may be different. All local laws apply.

Caches near or on military installations.

Caches near or under public structures deemed potential or possible targets for terrorist attacks. These include but are not limited to highway bridges, dams, government buildings, elementary and secondary schools, and airports.”

(http://www.geocaching.com/about/guidelines.aspx)

For police and security personnel the most problematic of geocaching practices is the placement of unlabeled, unapproved or threatening objects in public spaces. Such things as camouflaged ammunition boxes are large, olive-drab, and military in appearance and look ominous to non-cachers and civilian authorities alike. Though such containers are commonly used by hunters, gun enthusiasts, and outdoorsmen and -women for watertight storage and transport, they are not often seen by regular folk in civilian settings. It is worth noting that more recently geocachers often use transparent water-tight containers in lieu of the more ominous-looking military paraphernalia—this is to avoid the bomb scare issue. Even so, when caches are found under logs, rocks, or a bridge, or near an airport, military base, or public building, such a discovery will naturally raise concerns among the uninitiated. While all geocaches of such size should be prominently labeled with adhesive geocaching labels saying “geocache: do not remove,” such verbiage is often obscured by leaves, dirt, or the position of the cache. In any case, “geocaching” is a word unknown to the general public and the label will not of itself reassure the uninitiated. Therefore the police, forest rangers, deputies, or bomb squad will be notified. If law enforcement officials are equally uniformed they may send in robotic devices and explode the device in situ or at a safe remove from the site of discovery. When the cache box is exploded and its innocuous contents exposed, official embarrassment or anger will follow and the media by turns seem amazed and amused. This scenario has been repeated ad nauseam over the past decade. Geocaching has thus been banned from certain state parks in the United States in direct response to such an incident and those who have placed the cache have been placed in fear of arrest. Cooler heads have prevailed and cachers have not been hauled into court to “tell it to the judge.” Still, it would seem that police agencies would be fully informed about geocaching but this is definitely not the case. One can conduct a Google search of news items and encounter dozens of current news items like that above from many different states and countries, some of which are quite spectacular. Though the “bomb-scare” scenario represents a waste of law enforcement time and resources, police and security agencies, if properly educated and informed, could easily avoid most such incidents. Furthermore, caches are reviewed by volunteer reviewers at the state or provincial level before being finally approved by the main site. These reviewers are conscientious but do not catch every questionable placement. At times they are in fact accused of being rather overcautious. But, as the situation in some areas, such as Northern Ireland or other parts of the UK, dictates, being cautious seems prudent for everyone’s safety and for the survival of the
pastime. Geocaching.com showed rare prescience by preemptively temporarily suspending all geocaches within a mile of the London Olympics in the late summer of 2012. They did this to avoid any unpleasant incidents or untoward perceptions about the pastime.

It needs to be said that other geocaching behaviors, though legal, sometimes seem suspect and invite police concern. For example, the act of secreting or stealthily seeking any object in a public place or near a business seems suspicious in itself. Furthermore, cachers frequently search at night for additionally excitement. While “night caching” they often operate behind businesses and in vacant lots and buildings where caches can be placed without anyone in the general public noticing. Police, however, who look for suspicious activities, rightly deem cars full of casually-dressed men (cachers are usually male) cruising such areas as highly suspect. Such groups may appear to be loiterers or those looking for prostitutes, trying to score drugs or casing a business prior to a burglary. When cachers debooch from their cars and start lifting objects and looking behind businesses and office complexes, as is frequently done, it simply invites official intervention. Moreover, cachers frequently carry tools to aid in extracting geocaches from tight placements. A kit of these tools would often resemble tools utilized by burglars or those attempting to break into a structure. Police contacts with geocachers in this situation are surprisingly few. When they occur, geocachers, forced to explain their behavior, almost always leave unarrested, leaving police scratching their heads and with something to talk about at the end of their shift.

Although prohibited by the rules stated above, geocaches are also frequently placed in the supports and girders which underlie bridges. When such placements occur, those seeking the caches can seem like homeless people, vagrants, or active terrorists to the uninformed law enforcement officer, or security person. Again, the uninitiated, finding a cache in such an unusual setting, assuming it to be a bomb or a drug drop, may call the authorities. Sometimes caches placed in proximity to construction sites arouse similar concerns and security personnel will call police for backup.

Another problematic placement involves the use of highway guardrails. Such metallic safety features are ideally suited for secreting a magnetic key box containing only a log along a stretch of highway. Sometimes caches are placed every tenth of a mile (the minimum) distance between caches, along certain roads and highways. Such caches can present dangers to cache seekers as they might be hit by passing cars if they do not exit their cars carefully. The parked or idling cars themselves could be rear-ended. Placements such as these have been actively discouraged by some geocachers and by some local sheriffs in the United States. Highway Patrol officers will often stop to see if the geocachers parked by the roadside are motorists in distress—a situation which almost always forces the seeker to reluctantly divulge the nature of his activity and again leaves the officer bemused, amused, or irritated.

Public parks and playgrounds seem like ideal spots for geocachers. They are, after all, public spots where all forms of legal outdoor recreation are assumed to be approved and even encouraged. However, such places are often frequented by individuals seeking drugs and certain male-on-male attentions. Police and park security give suspicious single males special consideration in such situations. Acting stealthily and furtively, as is the norm among geocachers, may encourage authorities to suppose that one is hiding or picking up secreted drugs, drug money, or even an explosive device. Moreover, a single male prowling the edges of a playground may invite the anger and attention of concerned parents or caregivers. In California an angry grandmother had to be restrained by police from attacking a geocacher who was assumed to be a rapist. Therefore, in the most seemingly innocent and innocent of public places, a geocacher may be thought to be engaging in highly suspect activity. Police and even intervention by concerned citizens or property owners may follow.

Another problem involves the issue of environmental degradation. National parks in the United States classify geocaches as litter and prohibit their placement within their boundaries. What would seem a pretty harmless form of recreation is thus banned from a large expanse of public space. True to form, geocachers resent and resist this characterization and thus, where practicable, place caches just without the borders of these areas. Therefore, one can look at maps of national parks in the United States at geocaching.com, and see geocaches placed in some number just outside of the boundaries of such parks and national monuments. That notwithstanding, the issue of actual environmental degradation caused by overuse of a fragile ecological zone is not an abstraction. Geocachers can do a lot of damage to mosses, vegetation, and even rocks when they spontaneously and inadvertently create “geotrails” leading from main-traveled trails or roadways to and from caches (Chavez, 2003). Geocachers are thus encouraged not to place caches in environmentally sensitive areas at all and to move such geocaches when the areas in which they were initially placed are deemed to be problematic by other cachers or authorities. This being said, some similar parks and preserves in the United Kingdom contain hundreds of geocaches.

Access to caches surrounded by private land may on occasion become a matter of police or security intervention. For example a cache might be placed
by a cache which used an obscure or unmapped route to gain entry to a caching site. The seeker, however, not knowing that there is only one safe or unobstructed entry point to the cache site may deliberately or inadvertently trespass on private property or high security/military sites. Again, this is not a hypothetical exercise as caches have been placed on areas adjoining military bases or nuclear power and transhipment sites. Determined cachers frequently will choose to take a shortcut through such a high-security zone to avoid crossing a creek or to avoid a long-roundabout hike. Such a practice might bring them up against an irate (and possibly armed) property owner, or a bored and jumpy military police officer.

In this connection geocachers who might be unfamiliar to an area, drawn as they are to find caches in odd and obscure places, in the context of teasing out a cache, might unwittingly park their cars in areas known to police as “lovers’ lanes” or in locales known a drug hotspots or spots for commercial sexual assignation. Sometimes, though not often, caches are deliberately placed by puckish cache “owners” to put unwary cachers in such awkward situations. Also, when geocachers park their cars in such areas in their search for caches their cars are vulnerable to break-ins and theft and the cachers themselves to armed assault, robbery, and other types of victimization. In some rural areas it is commonplace for cars parked in recreational areas or at trailheads to be broken into or vandalized.

As caches are frequently placed in unsavory, out of the way, and insalubrious spots in alleys, swamps, or in open fields and woods, vermin, such as fire ants, ticks, and mosquitoes are frequently encountered. Cachers could be infected by various vermin-borne diseases such as Rocky Mountain spotted fever, West Nile virus, Lyme disease, or, in some locales, malaria or yellow fever. Various toxins are sometimes encountered by cachers stumbling on unapproved chemical dump sites. Poison ivy infestations are extremely common and in many parts of the United States one will see venomous reptiles such as rattlesnakes, copperheads, or cottonmouths while searching for geocaches in the wild. In addition, geocachers commonly stick their hands under woodpiles, leaves, and rocks—all prime habitat for snakes of all sorts. In recent years, bears, moose, and even donkeys, have attacked and killed people in the outdoors in the United States. All these situations might require emergency care and police or security intervention.

Finally, geocachers, like other outdoor enthusiasts, frequently “bite off more than they can chew” and are injured while geocaching. Sprained ankles and broken limbs are common complaints among geocachers. One solitary North Carolina geocacher fell from a cliff and broke her back. She was only found when another lone geocacher fortuitously stumbled upon her later the same day. Had the weather been inclement she might have died of exposure. So though geocachers seldom get lost, due to the presence of the GPS receiver, if they do not have a cell phone, or if they are outside the reach of cell phone reception, their location may not be known to anyone and they may need assistance. Police and park personnel finding parked cars in such locations should investigate cars which remain for an unusual amount of time.

Discussion

Geocaching is, then, a leisure activity which police, security, and emergency personnel can be expected to encounter in a number of situations and in a number of contexts. Both the placing of caches by geocachers and the searches conducted by their fellows look suspicious. Sometimes caches are placed in locations that present dangers to the cache seeker and to the general public. Seemingly safe places for cache placements, public parks and play areas at times elicit the public’s particular concern as they may be known as places for public sex (e.g., “dogging”) or locales for same-sex sexual assignation (i.e., “tea rooms”). Police and parents are particularly concerned about pedophiles lurking near play areas. Cachers may be injured by vermin, accident or criminal agency. Of most concern is the possibility of unfounded bomb scares.

Ultimately geocaching has at least two important dimensions with regard to enforcement of its official rules and unofficial pastime norms. It has a centralized focal point insofar as reporting of cache placement and cache finding. On the other hand, the activity as practiced in the field is acephalous (without a leader or localized leadership structure) and decentralized. Whereas the geocaching website can remove an inappropriately placed cache, individual cachers may enjoy finding the excitement and frisson of “the find” under adverse conditions, and hence, will probably not report it for review by the website or local reviewers. Since there is no incentive or reward for reporting badly-placed or inapt caches they may not come to the attention of geocaching.com.

It would seem that since the placement of geocache involves three layers of approval and responsibility there is adequate occasion for intervention and prevention. Caches are placed by the cache “owner.” They then have to be approved by the local reviewer who sends his/her assessment to geocaching.com. The geocaching website (run by Groundspeak) generally approves anything vouched for by the anonymous reviewer. However, these
steps, no matter how rigorously adhered to, cannot catch all caches of a problematic nature. And some caches which are placed in deep woods, miles from any security threat, are occasionally reported to authorities by “muggles” and duly exploded by bomb squads—much to the consternation of all involved. Educational efforts are equally decentralized and local, state, provincial, and national agencies are left with the responsibility of informing themselves about the pastime. Groundspeak’s excellent informational web material (http://www.geocaching.com/parksandpolice/) and pamphlets targeted at security and law enforcement agencies are generally only discovered by an impacted agency after the fact of a bomb scare incident. Thus, decentralization of the activity itself and of security and law enforcement agencies generally exacerbates the issue.

National security agencies through their informational outreach media should make every effort to inform agencies at all levels about specific aspects of the pastime. Funds should be allotted to have short workshops on the subject conducted at already scheduled annual meeting of terrorism, security, and police officials. It is even more critical that workshops be held at the level of street-level responders in all criminal justice and security agencies. Game wardens and forest rangers should be fully informed as well. In short, officers should learn about this activity and its possible impact on their duties. Most importantly they should learn how to identify a geocache in the field and how to confirm its identity online. While a few individual officers in most agencies are savvy to this issue, the knowledge needs to be universally disseminated.

Geocaching.com through its website and forums should more actively advocate for cache placement that is more sensitive to public perceptions and security issues. It should be impressed upon individual reviewers and geocachers that inappropriate and irresponsible placements create risks for geocachers, first responders, security personnel, the public, and even for the pastime itself. For while it is unlikely that the pastime would be banned or that satellite reception would be cut off (due to the huge growth of GPS based phones and directional devices for autos and boats), it is entirely possible that individual jurisdictions and agencies will attempt to ban the activity from property under their aegis and thus limit the proliferation of caches desired by geocaches. Geocaching has, like much of leisure in general, “antisocial, amoral and deviant” (Rojek, 1999, p. 86) aspects. However, banning the pastime while the technology remains intact would, given the transgressive nature of some aspects of the activity (“...the pressure to test rules, to go beyond boundaries, is a constant feature of all forms of leisure culture” (Rojek 1999, p. 88)), only drive competitive geocachers underground and make it impossible to police or regulate.

References
Caches on Land Maintained by the U.S. National Park Service or U.S. Fish and Wildlife.
Securing Venues of Mass Gatherings

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Abstract
Recent tragedies demonstrate that seemingly secure locations can become the subject of violent attacks. Suddenly an elementary school, college campus, movie theatre or shopping mall can become the scene of mass casualties and mayhem. All of these locations share a common trait. They each can be defined as a venue of mass gathering. None of these locations are immune to violent attack. In order to mitigate this threat a process that addresses prevention as well as preparedness is needed so that security vulnerabilities are detected and corrective actions are implemented that reduce the risk. In coordination with the Institute for the Study of Security in Education (ISSE) at William Carey University, the Major Event Security Aware (MESA™) process is being implemented at several universities. The MESA™ process is designed to assist stakeholders responsible for safety and security impacting a variety of critical infrastructures, key assets, and venues of mass gatherings. The process includes the following steps: threat assessment, risk assessment, emergency response plan, security site survey, training, and exercise.

Introduction
Recent tragedies demonstrate that seemingly secure locations can become the subject of violent attacks. Suddenly an elementary school, college campus, movie theatre or shopping mall can become the scene of mass casualties and mayhem. All of these locations share a common trait. They each can be defined as a venue of mass gathering. A venue of mass gathering is the collection of large numbers of people, at one site or location, for a common purpose and for a certain duration of time where there is a potential for delayed response to emergencies because of limited access due to features of the environment and location (Arbon, 2007). This is the common definition utilized by the public health community.

In addition to the locations already listed, other venues of mass gathering include stadiums, convention centers, airports, hotels, rail stations, casinos/resorts, amusement parks, parades, office building, beaches, financial districts, national monuments, etc. None of these locations are immune to violent attack. In order to mitigate this threat a process that addresses prevention as well as preparedness is needed so that security vulnerabilities are detected and corrective actions are implemented that reduce the risk.

Previous research conducted at The University of Southern Mississippi by Dr. Stacey Hall and James A. McGee identified a list of minimum standards that are necessary in order to begin the process of securing stadiums (Hall, et al., 2010). These include a total number of 33 baseline protective security measures in six categories: Physical Security, Technical Security, Access Control, Emergency Management, Training and Exercise, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. These measures are applicable to other venues of mass gathering and are designed to meet one or more of the following four objectives (Protective Measures Guide for U.S. Sports Leagues, 2008):

1. Devalue: lower the value of a facility to terrorists; thereby making the facility less attractive as a target.
2. Detect: spot the presence of suspicious activities and provide responders with information to execute an effective response.
3. Deter: make the facility difficult to attack.
4. Defend: respond to an attack and mitigate consequences of an incident.

Recent case studies reveal that venues of mass gatherings of all sizes share many of the same safety and security concerns as well as similar vulnerabilities. In speaking with campus representatives, they concur that cyber security, sport venue security, and campus access control all present serious gaps in their respective security apparatus that is currently in place. In the wake of the tragedies at Sandy Hook Elementary, Virginia Tech, the University of Northern Illinois and other campuses, campus administrators want to ensure that students and faculty are attending a school that provides a safe and secure environment. This does not translate into an environment that is 100% secure and unduly impacted by oppressive and restrictive measures of security; rather a series of proactive and responsible steps and/or a “process” that maximizes the safety and security of the client base.

Major Event Security Aware

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In coordination with the Institute for the Study of Security in Education (ISSE) at William Carey University, the Major Event Security Aware (MESA™) process is being implemented at several universities. The MESA™ process is designed to assist stakeholders responsible for safety and security impacting a variety of critical infrastructures, key assets, and venues of mass gatherings. Essentially, the fundamental security process developed for such events in the United States as the Olympics, Super Bowls, and National Conventions have been modified and adapted to these environments in order to enhance the ability to deter, detect, respond to, and manage threats and/or incidents impacting the safety and security of the above mentioned environments. The authors believe that the application of the MESA™ process to such key assets as K-12 institutions and university campuses will provide a mechanism to strategically commit to the highest level of safety and security while maintaining an environment that promotes learning, creativity, and academic achievement. The MESA™ process is a balanced approach that integrates the mission and responsibilities of Campus Police Departments and Federal, State, and Local Public Safety Agencies with the student, faculty, and Executive Leadership populations.

This concept focuses on safety and security measures for venues of mass gatherings. The process is applicable to the large university, small junior college, or K-12 setting. The MESA™ process addresses and subsequently includes the following steps:

- Campus Threat Assessment
- Campus Risk Assessment
- Campus Emergency Response Plan
- Campus Security Site Survey
- Compendium of Training Courses
- Compendium of Exercise Scenarios

The Campus Threat Assessment utilizes established points-of-contact as well as strategic analysis of available intelligence and information. A Campus Risk Assessment, based upon proven methodologies, examines the identification and prioritization of assets; aggressor threat paths; consequence analysis; gap analysis; corrective measures and cost benefit analysis specific to the campus environment. The Campus Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is reviewed and consolidated into a standard format. In the event the ERP requires updating or additional annexes are needed, they are developed pursuant to the requirements of the university. Topics of special interest include but are not limited to a communications plan, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) plan, active shooter protocol, behavioral assessment plan, terrorism plan, pandemic plan, cyber security plan, severe weather plan, continuity of operations plan, game day operations plan, evacuation plan and existing memorandum of understanding (MOU) and standard operating procedures (SOPs). All plans may be made available in electronic format via a collaboration software toolkit that allows easy access to update, modify, retrieve and manage the ERP and associated annexes. The Campus Security Site Survey provides the university with 360-degree video and still photo coverage of all campus buildings and grounds. Coverage of all exterior and interior details along with building computer-aided design (CADs) and/or blueprints is made available via the collaboration software toolkit. This is critical information for first responders in the event of a crisis incident that could potentially require an evacuation, rescue, and/or tactical resolution. The service is further enhanced with current geographic information system (GIS) data specific to the campus and surrounding area.

A Compendium of Training Courses and Exercises will be available for the university administrator, faculty, staff or student. Campus’s depend upon their critical infrastructure during all aspects of daily life. A course that addresses security measures focused on protecting the critical infrastructure will discuss risk mitigation and preparedness techniques as well as real world crisis response and recovery incidents pursuant to case studies. The course will conclude with a capstone tabletop exercise that encourages class discussion and multi-agency collaboration. A broad spectrum of U.S. Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) compliant exercise scenarios will be available and/or will be developed and delivered in various discussion-based and operation-based formats that assist in validating plans, policies, agreements, and procedures. Existing scenarios include severe weather, active shooter/active threat, improvised explosive device (IED)/Vehicle-Borne IED, suicide bomber, HAZMAT Chemical (CBRNE), HAZMAT Biological (CBRNE), Pandemic Threat, Cyber Threat, etc.

In January 2013 the MESA™ process was applied at a K-12 institution located in an urban/residential setting in the Southeast, United States. Each step of the MESA™ process was conducted beginning with a Threat Assessment that addressed the All Hazard threat to include natural disasters, manmade disasters, cyber attacks, criminal and terrorism incidents. Following the Threat Assessment, a Campus Security Site Survey and comprehensive Campus Risk Assessment were performed. Pursuant to these steps recommendations were made that addressed potential security gaps. The
Campus Emergency Response Plan was reviewed for completeness and a series of courses were recommended for faculty, staff, students, and parents. An exercise timeline was also recommended to campus administrators that test emergency plans and procedures.

Conclusion

Whether you are a campus administrator, a sports venue manager, or a casino/resort operator, your security and safety program should be based on a comprehensive security and safety analysis, strategic plan, and pragmatic implementation of proven methodologies. The MESA™ process is built upon concepts and successes developed and implemented for major events throughout the United States over the last 17 years. The authors have taken these best practices and lessons learned from major event security advancements and tailored those critical components to the venue of mass gathering environment. The result is a process that fully contemplates the requirements that will contribute to the effective and efficient improvements in the security and safety needs of the specific mass gathering venue.

References